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Titlebook: Computer Science Logic; 20th International W Zoltán ésik Conference proceedings 2006 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006 AI logics.Actio

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樓主: AMUSE
41#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 17:09:03 | 只看該作者
42#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 19:22:45 | 只看該作者
Verification of Ptime Reducibility for System F Terms Via Dual Light Affine Logicaddress the problem of typing lambda-terms in second-order .. For that we give a procedure which, starting with a term typed in system F, finds all possible ways to decorate it into a . typed term. We show that our procedure can be run in time polynomial in the size of the original Church typed system F term.
43#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 23:27:00 | 只看該作者
44#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 03:12:40 | 只看該作者
The Cassini Cosmic Dust Analyzer,als into sets of strongly normalizing terms. It is shown that upper semi-continuity of such functions is a sufficient semantical criterion for admissibility. To provide a syntactical criterion, a calculus for semi-continuous function is developed.
45#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 07:59:04 | 只看該作者
Semi-continuous Sized Types and Terminationals into sets of strongly normalizing terms. It is shown that upper semi-continuity of such functions is a sufficient semantical criterion for admissibility. To provide a syntactical criterion, a calculus for semi-continuous function is developed.
46#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 13:48:57 | 只看該作者
47#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 18:36:18 | 只看該作者
48#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 23:24:41 | 只看該作者
49#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 01:35:27 | 只看該作者
Concurrent Games with Tail Objectivesh tail objectives. We prove the . property for tail objectives, that states for all concurrent games if the optimum value for a player is positive for a tail objective Φ at some state, then there is a state where the optimum value is?1 for Φ, for the player. We also show that the optimum values of .
50#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 05:11:18 | 只看該作者
Nash Equilibrium for Upward-Closed Objectives depend only on the current state. We also study the complexity of finding values (payoff profile) of an .-Nash equilibrium. We show that the values of an .-Nash equilibrium in nonzero-sum concurrent games with upward-closed objectives for all players can be computed by computing .-Nash equilibrium
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