Titlebook: Communicating Sequential Processes. The First 25 Years; Symposium on the Occ Ali E. Abdallah,Cliff B. Jones,Jeff W. Sanders Book 2005 Sprin

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Verifying Security Protocols: An Application of CSPreason about security properties such as confidentiality and authentication. In this paper we describe one such approach, based on theorem-proving, that uses the idea of a rank function to establish the correctness of protocols. This description is motivated by the consideration of a simple, but fla

Affiliation

Shedding Light on Haunted Corners of Information Securityd remains controversial to this day. Non-interference was proposed some 25 years ago to give a precise, formal characterisation of the absence of information flows through a system, motivated in large part by the discovery of “covert channels” in access control models such as Bell-LaPadula. Intuitiv

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Operational Semantics for Fun and Profitonal semantics for CSP, in order to determine a denotational property by exploring an operationally presented system. But the calculation of the standard structured operational semantics of complex systems proves a bottleneck in the performance of the tool, and so we compile a custom inference syste

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Engaging

Applied Formal Methods – From CSP to Executable Hybrid Specifications a variety of “real-world” projects. These include the verification of high-availability database servers, of fault-tolerant computers now operable in the International Space Station, hardware-in-the-loop tests for the novel Airbus A380 aircraft controller family and conformance tests for the Europe

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0302-9743 re’s paper “Communicating Sequential Processes” is today widely regarded as one of the most in?uential papers in computer science. To comm- orate it, an event was organized under the auspices of BCS-FACS (the British Computer Society’s Formal Aspects of Computing Science specialist group). CSP25 was

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I Made Avendias Mahawan,Agus Harjokoat uses the idea of a rank function to establish the correctness of protocols. This description is motivated by the consideration of a simple, but flawed, authentication protocol. We show how a rank function analysis can be used to locate this flaw and prove that a modified version of the protocol is correct.

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