Titlebook: Collingwood on Philosophical Methodology; Karim Dharamsi,Giuseppina D‘Oro,Stephen Leach Book 2018 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Au

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Awning

Pastry

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-73084-9 latter does not so much argue for as assume that metaphysics is a historical discipline. Sympathetic, Van der Dussen argues that the metaphysician uncovers presuppositions, but it is the task of the special sciences to change them. It is only in relation to other metaphysicians that the Collingwood

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-80567-6church and that while there are family resemblances between Collingwood and philosophers of a pragmatist orientation, there are also some important differences. Collingwood tends to have in common with all pragmatists a rejection of the correspondence theory of truth. But unlike classical pragmatist

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Dritter Entwicklungszyklus (iPad App)ained criticism in his . (2006). She argues that Collingwood’s metaphysics of absolute presuppositions aims to defend a form of epistemic pluralism which is not reducible to the kind of epistemic relativism Boghossian critiques. The decoupling of epistemic pluralism from epistemic relativism rests o

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Erster Entwicklungszyklus (Papierversion)ll. Both Collingwood and McDowell, Dharamsi argues, acknowledge the irreducibly normative (in Collingwood’s words: criteriological) nature of the study of mind and both reject the widespread naturalist assumption that philosophy is continuous with natural science. The liberal naturalist’s and Collin