Titlebook: Coercion and the State; David A. Reidy,Walter J. Riker Book 2008 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008 Religion.coercion.justice.law,

RAGE

conscience

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-41988-5ith coercion in institutional or political contexts (paradigmatically, coercive state action). Nevertheless, coercion in interpersonal contexts is not absent from the discussion, and for good reason. Insofar as the concept of coercion is put to work in both interpersonal and institutional or politic

知識分子

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-41988-5inding neat conceptual boundaries for it. Historically, as now, “coercion” appears to be a catch-all term, rather than one that clearly demarcates, say, acts of domination from acts of badgering or arm-twisting. Typically, however, it is used to capture a way that agents with considerable power can

省略

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-82315-2 in accordance with the coercer’s demands..The word . in this definition refers either to natural persons—i.e., particular individuals—or to artificial persons, in the Hobbesian sense—i.e., collective or corporate actors such as corporations, churches, labor unions, or governments. Thus, one individ

wangle

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-68680-1 or her baseline, or where he or she was before the proposer intervened in the victim’s causal nexus. This model of coercion that focuses only on the notion of threats does not go far enough to capture cases where the victim’s vulnerability is taken advantage of to accomplish the coercion. In the ki

Daily-Value

Anticonvulsants

劇毒

concert

未開化

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-0783-6 A prudent person will consider forgoing the pleasure of his favorite drug out of fear of punishment, even if he believes the prohibition unjust. But, as H.L.A. Hart emphasized, much law consists not of such primary, conduct-controlling rules, but rather of secondary, power-conferring rules that est