Titlebook: Britain’s Nuclear Arms Control Policy in the Context of Anglo-American Relations, 1957–68; J. P. G. Freeman Book 1986 J. P. G. Freeman 198

譏笑

nocturnal

Macmillan and Eisenhower: The Test-ban Negotiations, 1957–60ns taken at national and international levels which transformed erudite speculations and assessments into an agreement to prohibit nuclear tests and inhibit or ‘control’ the nuclear arms race.. Equally, however widespread and publicised thess movement of protest might have been, that protest availed

HEPA-filter

Independence and Multilateralism: Morality and Self-interestabrupt American cancellation of the . missile which was destined to be the means of delivering Britain’s nuclear weapons. Instead of . Macmillan secured the far superior . sea-borne missile. However, Britain had secured an extension of its nuclear capabilities at exactly the same time as she was pus

最小

The MLF and Centralised Nuclear Control, 1964–71. It had been subject to all the travails of opposition — notably the internal disputes and a threatened leadership, lacking in authority, so peculiar to the Labour Party. Above all, it had persecuted itself with calculated fervour over the question of Britain’s nuclear deterrent. Additionally, Lab

harangue

Monocle

Tact and Persuasion: The NPT Achieved, 1966–8le progress except in so far as the central issue dividing East and West was brought ever more clearly into focus. The American draft, many provisions of which were unobjectionable to fellow nuclear powers, was, as we have seen, offensive to the Soviet Union in one particular: the possibility of fut

AVANT

Macmillan and Eisenhower: The Test-ban Negotiations, 1957–60ons tests in the atmosphere and helped devise means of verifying compliance with a treaty. The protesters acted as an insistent chorus which the government found difficult to ignore; they played a part by encouraging the government to pursue with determination the search for a CTBT, but they did not

極端的正確性

The Search for a Non-proliferation Treaty, 1964–6 which came close to offering Germany associate, if not full, membership of the ‘nuclear club’. The MLF episode provided a further lesson: that Russia was firmly, immovably, opposed to a German ‘finger on a nuclear trigger’ and that to give continuing priority to German demands in NATO would endange

Grievance

CBC471

Britain’s Nuclear Arms Control Policy in the Context of Anglo-American Relations, 1957–68978-1-349-07807-3