Titlebook: Britain and Danubian Europe in the Era of World War II, 1933-1941; Andras Becker Book 2021 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s)

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Managing Uncertainty, Mitigating Riskrman calculations from 1936. Other countries in East Central and South-East Europe such as Poland and Yugoslavia have appeared regularly in the English language historiography (due to their heroic resistance against the Nazis), but British policy in Danubian Europe (i.e. Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rom

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Ivar Bleiklie,Jürgen Enders,Benedetto Leporitain was reluctant in the past to pledge military assistance to a continental power, but also publically committing to it, even though the obligation could not be met by direct military assistance, especially naval power, is entirely unprecedented.

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Ivar Bleiklie,Jürgen Enders,Benedetto Leporid be allowed to tie the hands of the Allies, whom, from the British standpoint, after all, were fighting for them, was a regular debate in the Cabinet. Mining Norwegian territorial waters in order to stop Swedish iron ore from reaching Germany was rejected several times by ministers due to ‘fear of

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2947-7182 licymaking, war strategy, East Central and South East EuropeThis book is a study of British official attitudes towards the Danubian countries (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia) from Hitler’s rise to power in 1933 to the year 1941, a period that marked serious but fruitless British pol

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Ivar Bleiklie,Jürgen Enders,Benedetto Lepori. Mining Norwegian territorial waters in order to stop Swedish iron ore from reaching Germany was rejected several times by ministers due to ‘fear of German counteractions’ and also on the grounds that ‘a(chǎn)ny benefit accruing would be offset by the adverse reaction of international and neutral [particularly American] opinion’.

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,Contemplating Alternatives: Britain and Danubian Europe Between War and Peace, March 1940–April 194. Mining Norwegian territorial waters in order to stop Swedish iron ore from reaching Germany was rejected several times by ministers due to ‘fear of German counteractions’ and also on the grounds that ‘a(chǎn)ny benefit accruing would be offset by the adverse reaction of international and neutral [particularly American] opinion’.