Titlebook: Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets; Proceedings of the F Reinhard Tietz,Wulf Albers,Reinhard Selten Conference pro

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Inelasticity

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-53421-8ubsequent games. One main result is that contrary to Binmore et al. the game theoretic solution has nearly no predictive power. Whereas in one round-games the major consideration is to protect an unfair agreement by sufficiently high cost for choosing conflict, limited rationality will require to an

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Canopy

Ultimatum Bargaining for a Shrinking Cake — An Experimental Analysis —ubsequent games. One main result is that contrary to Binmore et al. the game theoretic solution has nearly no predictive power. Whereas in one round-games the major consideration is to protect an unfair agreement by sufficiently high cost for choosing conflict, limited rationality will require to an

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Experimental Economics: A Psychological Perspective

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Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and MarketsProceedings of the F

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Experimental Economics: Ways to Model Bounded Rational Bargaining Behaviorvior. Testing hypotheses and constructing theories are the two main tasks of this discipline..A paradigm intensively investigated in experimental economics is the bilateral bargaining situation. Similar to other paradigmata, as the oligopoly or the coalition problem, it was the seeming indeterminate

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inquisitive

Learning to Make Good Predictions in Time Series(1) Is there a learning process towards better predictions? (2) Can the last predictions be explained by a weak form of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis? (3) Can we observe short-term adaptations of the prediction rule and, if so, how do they work? (4) Are there better descriptions of prediction