Titlebook: Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets; Proceedings of the F Reinhard Tietz,Wulf Albers,Reinhard Selten Conference pro

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異端

0075-8442 Overview: 978-3-540-50036-0978-3-642-48356-1Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957

協(xié)迫

Economic Impact of Lumpy Skin Disease,(1) Is there a learning process towards better predictions? (2) Can the last predictions be explained by a weak form of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis? (3) Can we observe short-term adaptations of the prediction rule and, if so, how do they work? (4) Are there better descriptions of prediction behaviour than Rational Expectations?

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不規(guī)則

Bumptious

創(chuàng)作

Crater-Hopping: Observing the Moon on Day 4,s of the famous Hall theory of optimal consumption under income uncertainty, and, in particular, to test the proposition (revealed to us in a preliminary pilot study) that behaviour is not optimal in an absolute sense, but that its comparative static implications agree with those of optimality theor

職業(yè)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-53421-8ut the paper a simple investment task is referred to, which can be interpreted as a multistage betting game. This task is described in section 1, and also a specific operationalization (breeding lizards task). In Section 2 a first coarse analysis of the the general process of dealing with a multista

Sarcoma

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-53421-8ferent known outcomes if they mutually cooperate or mutually noncooperate. This context thus addresses dilemmas in general rather than the unlikely but more often studied symmetric dilemma. Observations from a series of studies indicate that, in dilemmas that provide one party with leverage and the

Customary

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-53421-8rent degrees of conflict severity. The variables were recorded with a computer assisted questionnaire and during the initial period of a sequence of games. Results from 106 subjects showed that their social ’motives’ remained essentially stable across the different games. Expectancies and choices we