Titlebook: Belief, Evidence, and Uncertainty; Problems of Epistemi Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay,Gordon Brittan Jr.,Mark Book 2016 The Author(s) 2016 Bay

小卒

prolate

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-84572-6e than probable/likely. Intuitively, even obviously, some claims are more probable/likely than others. Everyone agrees that scientific claims in particular are probable/likely to the extent that they are confirmed by experimental evidence. But there is very little agreement about what “confirmation

注意力集中

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-84572-6ach have been given. In order to make the distinction between them as intuitive and precise as possible, we answer the first in a Bayesian way: a hypothesis is confirmed to the extent that the data raise the probability that it is true. We answer the second question in a Likelihoodist way, that is,

Conscientious

legitimate

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易怒

調(diào)色板

alcoholism

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-96877-8ians and Glymour, but unlike us, his own account of evidence incorporates what we have called the “true-model” assumption, that there is a conceptual connection between the existence of evidence for a hypothesis and having a good reason to believe that the hypothesis is true. In this connection, and

泛濫

Das Risiko der industriellen Unternehmungso difficult to resolve is that the assumptions that generate them are so intuitive that they resist rejection or reconfiguration. The “paradoxes of confirmation” have been especially difficult to resolve. As much is indicated by the vast literature to which they have given rise. The “raven” and “gr