Titlebook: Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science; Erik J. Olsson,Sebastian Enqvist Book 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011 AGM Theo

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The Best of All PossibleWorlds: Where Interrogative Games Meet Research Agendas,to adequately model an epistemic state one needs, in addition to a belief set (or corpus, or theory, i.e. a set closed under deduction) . and (say) an entrenchment relation ., a .., i.e. a set of questions satisfying certain corpus-relative preconditions (hence called .-questions) the agent would li

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Functional vs. Relational Approaches to Belief Revision,Roughly, functionalists hold that the result of revising a cognitive state with some new datum is a unique rationally determined belief state. Relationalists disagree. In their view, there may be several rationally admissible results of revising a cognitive state with a given datum. In an attempt to

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-21118-9s”. In this paper Alchourron, G?rdenfors, and Makinson investigate the properties that such a method should have in order to be intuitively appealing. The result was a set of postulates (named AGM postulates after the initials of the authors) that every belief change operator should satisfy. The “AG

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Industrie 4.0 – eine Bestandsaufnahmeely the dynamics of changes in scientific knowledge. But in spite of this connection, there has been relatively little contact between the two disciplines. There is an obvious reason for this lack of contact: The standard framework that is used in the belief change literature is not suitable for ana