Titlebook: Bargaining in Economic and Ethical Environments; An Experimental Stud Marlies Klemisch-Ahlert Book 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1

漂亮

硬化

Norms in Economic and Ethical Environments the bargaining behavior in some of the games we can conclude that envy plays a role. The effect of envy is due to a certain power of the equal payoff principle. In some experiments this principle was not dominated by a collective efficiency principle defined by the strong Pareto efficiency in payoffs.

ingrate

Cultural Capital in Health Promotion, element in .,and if there exists an alternative . with an image . in . such that every person strictly prefers . to x., i.e. s > d. For every bargaining situation a bargaining solution . selects a point . (.,.) in .

Camouflage

Introduction and Organising Ideas,stributive mechanisms on a space of economic environments. We give a short overview on Roemer’s results and we concentrate our description on the comparison between classical bargaining theory and bargaining theory on economic environments. Notations, definitions and theorems of this chapter are modified versions of those Roemer (1988) proposes.

歡樂(lè)東方

generic

Roemer’s Bargaining Theory on Economic Environmentsstributive mechanisms on a space of economic environments. We give a short overview on Roemer’s results and we concentrate our description on the comparison between classical bargaining theory and bargaining theory on economic environments. Notations, definitions and theorems of this chapter are modified versions of those Roemer (1988) proposes.

燈絲

entreat

0075-8442 g concept with goals that depend on economic and ethical features of the bargaining situation is introduced. Observations from the experimental data lead to the ideas for the axiomatic characterization of a bargaining solution with goals.978-3-540-61048-9978-3-642-46827-8Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957

粗鄙的人

Introductionn the class of normative solution concepts like the Nash solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (1975) and others. Sen (1970) argues, that the status quo of a bargaining situation may be an inappropriate reference point to select a social alternative by bargaining, because of the possible injustic

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