Titlebook: Axiomatic Models of Bargaining; Alvin E. Roth Book 1979 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1979 bargaining.cooperative games.evaluation.uti

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Humanistic Psychology and Metapsychologyernatives can be uniquely determined by specifying the outcome which it selects in the ‘canonical’ game (ā,ō). Each of the two independence properties represents an assumption concerning the way in which different bargaining games are related to one another, and together they essentially imply that

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-1071-6e players’ utility functions.. By ordinal information, we mean information about each player’s preference ordering over riskless alternatives. If A is a set of riskless alternatives over which player i has a preference ordering, then any realvalued function u. on A such that u. (a) > u. (b) if and o

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-1071-6cular bargains which might yield those utilities. This permitted us to summarize in a concise way each player’s preferences over all possible bargains, including those which might involve chance events (i.e., lotteries), without explicitly considering those lotteries.

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0075-8442 ch are made in the analysis of more complex cooperative games can more easily be discerned in studying bargaining games. The various models of bargaining consid978-3-540-09540-8978-3-642-51570-5Series ISSN 0075-8442 Series E-ISSN 2196-9957