Titlebook: Axiomatic Formal Ontology; Uwe Meixner Book 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1997 English literature.construction.individual

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Possibility and Necessity state of affairs is analytically possible, precisely if it does not analytically imply a contradiction. According to the younger definition, which was advanced by Leibniz, a state of affairs is analytically possible, precisely if it obtains in some possible world.

AGATE

Mingle

amphibian

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-85722-4on against this definition that it is too narrow; for one would certainly like to call some entities “states of affairs” which are not the intensions of statements (not the intensions of meaningful declarative sentences), although they could be. Moreover, it may be that the definition is also too wi

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Freedom of Will: A History of Theories,t .. In the philosophical tradition there are, however, two definitions of the concept of analytical possibility. According to the older definition, a state of affairs is analytically possible, precisely if it does not analytically imply a contradiction. According to the younger definition, which wa

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Sonja Novkovi?,Karen Miner,Cian McMahonor if it were, then . state of affairs would be an obtaining state of affairs, according to DP31, since the contradictory state of affairs is ., the . state of affairs, of which all states of affairs are (intensional) parts. There is, however, no doubt that some states of affairs do not obtain.

LAP

Ermanno C. Tortia,Silvia Sacchettio DP31, to “..[O(.) or O(.(.))],” and this, in turn, according to DP32 and DP33, equivalent to “..(V(.) or F(.))” — “every state of affairs is true or false.” All the mentioned equivalences hold true analytically with respect to states of affairs on the basis of the posited definitions, given that A

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