Titlebook: Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory; Hans J. M. Peters Book 1992 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 1992 bargaining.game theory.utility the

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Alexander Dufort,Emma Gregory,Tricia Woo solutions are collected where the number of players may vary. The book shows that axioms based on such a variable population of players have proved to be powerful tools in axiomatic bargaining, leading to new characterizations of well-known solutions like the Nash, Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky, and egalitarian solutions.

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Mad Science or School-to-Prison?nly an understanding is required of the definition of a von NeumannMorgenstern utility function, which is presented in section 11.2. Everything else in this chapter may be read upon references in other chapters.

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Nash bargaining solutions, also these are not unambiguously conclusive in favor of the Nash solution. Even, earlier experiments by Crott (1971) point in the direction of the next popular solution, the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (Raiffa, 1953, Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975; see chapter 4).

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Alexander Dufort,Emma Gregory,Tricia Wooossibly nonconvex feasible sets. Certain applications and implications of axiomatic bargaining game theory for specific economic models are considered in section 8.5. Section 8.6 reviews a few (axiomatic) models where time is involved. Sections 8.7 and 8.8 very briefly discuss ordinally covariant solutions and continuity, respectively.

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