Titlebook: Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory; Hans J. M. Peters Book 1992 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 1992 bargaining.game theory.utility the

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0924-6126 semodels leading to bargaining solutions that also result from theaxiomatic approach. .The main existing axiomatizations of solutions for .coalitional..bargaini978-90-481-4178-4978-94-015-8022-9Series ISSN 0924-6126 Series E-ISSN 2194-3044

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Preliminaries,a solution or a class of solutions by its properties. Therefore, such properties are often referred to as axioms., which is a less neutral expression. We will use both terms, . as well . In a nutshell, this is what this book is mainly about.

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Der Roman und seine biblische Vorlagea solution or a class of solutions by its properties. Therefore, such properties are often referred to as axioms., which is a less neutral expression. We will use both terms, . as well . In a nutshell, this is what this book is mainly about.

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Book 1992ring the pastfour decades. .Axiomatic Bargaining Game Theory. provides achapter on noncooperative models of bargaining, in particular on thosemodels leading to bargaining solutions that also result from theaxiomatic approach. .The main existing axiomatizations of solutions for .coalitional..bargaini

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Nash bargaining solutions,t any doubt the Nash bargaining solution is the most well-known and popular solution concept in bargaining — in the theoretical literature as well as in applied and empirical work. What could be the reasons for this popularity? Empirical evidence for the Nash bargaining solution certainly is not ove

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Independence of irrelevant alternatives and revealed preferences, (1950), was based on the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) axiom. This chapter is a further exploration into the consequences of this axiom. This exploration is based on the concept of revealed preference, in the wider context of choice functions and choice situations.

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Risk properties,us for the other players. Also, one might expect the more risk averse player to envy his (less risk averse) predecessor, because that player would probably get more out of the bargaining process. It is nevertheless surprising that bargaining solutions almost generically seem to confirm this intuitio

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Bargaining with a variable number of players, hitherto the number of players in a bargaining game was assumed to be fixed. In Thomson and Lensberg (1989) axiomatic characterizations of bargaining solutions are collected where the number of players may vary. The book shows that axioms based on such a variable population of players have proved t