Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 17th International S Guido Sch?fer,Carmine Ventre Conference proceedings 2024 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and Th

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Putting sensory analysis into practice,ia exist under the above assumptions. On the geometric side, we show that strongly connected outerplanar graphs with undirected girth at least . always support some of these types of on-path pure equilibria. Finally, we show that a data structure describing all pure equilibria can be efficiently com

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Case History: Mapping of Coffee Products,andomness, closing an open question posed by Budinich and Fortnow?[.]?(EC?’11) and Hubá?ek, Naor and Ullman?[.]?(SAGT?’15,?TCSys?’16). Moreover, we prove a 0–1 law for randomness in repeated games, showing that any repeated game either has .(1)-randomness . equilibria, or all of its . equilibria req

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Fair Division with?Interdependent Valuesir equilibrium with respect to the true signals. We complement this result by showing that, even for very simple cases with binary additive interdependent valuation functions, no allocation mechanism that always admits an equilibrium, can guarantee that all equilibria are fair with respect to the tr

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Discrete Single-Parameter Optimal Auction Design’s payment formula for general discrete single-parameter auction settings. Additionally, we prove that total unimodularity of the feasibility space is a sufficient condition to guarantee the optimality of auctions with integral allocation rules. Finally, in the full version of our paper, we demonstr

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Estimating the?Expected Social Welfare and?Cost of?Random Serial Dictatorship agent for an item is equal to the distance of the corresponding points. We show that a (relatively) small number of samples is enough to approximate the expected social welfare of RSD in the value setting and its expected social cost in the metric cost setting despite the #P-hardness of the corresp

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