Titlebook: Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications; Second International Peter Coles,Sanmay Das,Boleslaw Szymanski Conference proceedings 2

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-76071-6 algorithms that identify profit-maximizing prices and bundle discounts. We introduce a richer probabilistic valuation model than prior work by capturing complementarity, substitutability, and covariance, and we provide a hybrid search technique for fitting such a model to historical shopping cart d

cushion

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-02711-0 Bayesian setting the buyers’ valuations for the goods are drawn from a prior distribution ., which is often assumed to be known by the seller. In this work, we focus on cases where the seller has no knowledge at all, and “the buyers know each other better than the seller knows them”. In our model,

Hallmark

沖突

Etching

DEMUR

咒語

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-02711-0in the adoption of school choice mechanisms. Similarly, college admissions in China have gone through many local experimentations, with a rich variety of mechanisms used in various provinces..In this paper, we investigate a family of proposal-refusal school choice mechanisms, including the Boston, S

冥界三河

Jürgen Herrmann,Renate Beckmannres the existence of stable assignment. The characterization of efficient priority structures implies that there is usually a conflict between efficiency and stability. Thus we turn to the problem of finding a constrained efficient assignment, and give an algorithm which solves the problem for any p

大都市

GZ-psycholoog en eigen praktijkneys is limited, the debate has been focused on the effects of the existence of a free market for human organs. Economists as well as medical and legal researchers are divided over the issue. Iran has a unique kidney market which has been in place for over 20 years, frequently reporting surprising s

學(xué)術(shù)討論會

Strategyproofness for “Price Takers” as a Desideratum for Market Designa mechanism may have manipulations that . (second-order manipulations). We say that a non-strategyproof mechanism is . (SP-L) if all of its manipulations vanish with market size; that is, if it is strategyproof for “price takers”. We put “price takers” in quotes because our notion is not limited to