Titlebook: Aristotle’s Idea of the Soul; Herbert Granger Book 1996 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1996 Aristotle.natural philosophy.nature

外形

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35330-8ill ever explain away in its own favor, and thus for good reason substantialists tend to ignore this evidence or at least they fail to stress it. This evidence is Aristotle’s own definition of soul as the ‘first actuality’ of a body possessed of organs, which he defines in terms redolent of disposit

Injunction

Introduction, into two main camps over the nature of soul or form: ‘a(chǎn)ttributivism’, in which soul is conceived as a ‘property’; ‘substantialism’, in which soul is conceived, in contrast with a property, as a ‘thing’, a subject of properties. Thus the contemporary analytic scholarship on the nature of the soul ma

笨拙處理

The Case for Attributivism,bjects, whether animate or inanimate, natural or artificial, be analyzed in terms of their matter and form. The matter of an object is the stuff that constitutes it or the things that compose its parts: bronze in the case of a bronze sphere; bricks, stones, and the like in the case of a house. The f

Cirrhosis

A Taxonomy for Substantialism,oul, but insist that, in one way or another, soul is not a substance apart from the body. W. Sellars appears to develop a version of substantialism that falls between Cartesianism and the identity-theory, which may be described as ‘kind dualism’. In this form of ‘dualism’ a single substance is a mem

endure

和平主義

FELON

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