Titlebook: Applied Industrial Organization; Towards a Theory-Bas Karl Aiginger,Jorg Finsinger Book 1994 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 1994 comp

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Slice Regular Functions: Analysis, series of extensions of the widely-used Cowling and Waterson (1976) model. Our extensions incorporate demand shocks, varying competition and collusion, and the role of unions. The resulting model encompasses Cowling/Waterson, the Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) varying competition model and the Green a

AUGUR

Slice Regular Functions: Algebra,ls (‘the new story’). In supergames the feasibility of collusion (and to some degree also actual profits) depends on relative profitability of defection versus that of collusion. The determinants for this evaluation — the time discount proper, riskiness of markets, exit probability and lags — can be

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lattice

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-60766-4ry into a market, which exhibits properties of a “natural monopoly”. If the subsidy promise is sufficiently high, the monopolist is led to increase output and lower price at no cost of regulation. The assumption that the monopolist always honors his pre-entry commitment has been shown to be crucial

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FEMUR

Innovation and Evolution as a Dynamic Game with Rational Behaviourproach even defines itself by the separation of the neo-classical approach. In this paper the two methods or philosophies are linked in a simple duopolistic model. It will be shown, that the strategic maximising behaviour of innovating firms leads in a dynamic model to routine decisions as equilibrium strategies.

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Portfolio Choice, Transactions Costs and Monopoly Powerking empirical evidence that pertains to West German industries. It thus appears that a capitalist economy is characterized by a built-in-mechanism stabilizing macroeconomic activity. This mechanism, however, is attenuated by monopoly power. That provides an additional rationale for competition policy.