Titlebook: Applied Cryptography and Network Security; 5th International Co Jonathan Katz,Moti Yung Conference proceedings 2007 Springer-Verlag Berlin

宣傳

Preventing Collusion Attacks on the One-Way Function Tree (OFT) Schemen large dynamic groups. Following Horng’s claim that the original OFT scheme was vulnerable to a collusion attack, Ku . studied the collusion attack on OFT and proposed a solution to prevent the attack. The solution, however, requires to broadcast about ..?+?. (. is the height of the key tree) keys

不能仁慈

PACT

A New Protocol for Conditional Disclosure of Secrets and Its Applicationssecrets (CDS) helps to overcome this restriction. In a CDS protocol for a set ., the client obtains server’s secret if and only if the client’s inputs belong to . and thus the server can guard itself against malformed queries. We extend the existing CDS protocols to work over additively homomorphic

繁榮地區(qū)

失誤

cartilage

Universal Accumulators with Efficient Nonmembership Proofsf values using a short accumulator and to efficiently compute a membership witness of any value that has been accumulated. Unlike traditional accumulators, this scheme also enables one to efficiently compute a nonmembership witness of any value that has not been accumulated. We give a construction f

先鋒派

Unlinkable Secret Handshakes and Key-Private Group Key Management Schemesnd anonymity of . information about the participants to . except of their intended authentication partners. Namely, if entity A certified by organization .. wants to authenticate itself only to other entities certified by .., and, symmetrically, entity B certified by .. wants to authenticate itself

偉大

Identity-Based Proxy Re-encryption. A number of solutions have been proposed in the public-key setting. In this paper, we address the problem of Identity-Based proxy re-encryption, where ciphertexts are transformed from one . to another. Our schemes are compatible with current IBE deployments and do not require any extra work from t

匯總

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29628-9t been signed yet) into strongly unforgeable ones (the message in the forgery could have been signed previously). Most of the techniques are based on trapdoor hash functions and all of them require adding supplementary components onto the original key pair of the signature scheme. In this paper, we

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