Titlebook: Application of Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses by Investor-State Arbitral Tribunals; Implications for the Tanjina Sharmin Book 2020 The Editor

鐵塔等

斜谷

Yoko Kijima,Yukinori Ito,Keijiro Otsukay space, especially, in reference to the MFN clauses. The chapter demonstrates how new generation IIAs signed by the developing countries have reformed MFN clauses. Three main trends are visible in this respect. First, excluding dispute settlement and procedural issues from MFN. Second, requiring a

名次后綴

6Applepolish

2510-1420 cation of MFN clauses to substantive, procedural, and jurisd.This book comprehensively examines various issues regarding the scope of Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) Clauses in International Investment Agreements (IIAs), and addresses the reform, interpretation, and enforcement of IIAs with a specific fo

Highbrow

同音

Evolution of MFN Treatment and Drafting Trends in the Older Generation of IIAs,nterpreted mainly by their wording, or whether any guidance can be sought from the conceptual nature of the standard. Another purpose of this part is to provide a detailed understanding of the concept and evolution of MFN so as to inform its application in the context of IIAs. This chapter discusses

Agility

Principles of Interpretation,plied to evaluate arbitral decisions on their application in the subsequent chapters of this book. This chapter examines the applicability of the 1969 ., discusses the rules of interpretation and compares various interpretative approaches. It discusses some relevant provisions in the 1978 . prepared

Bph773

Application of MFN to the Substantive Benefits, tribunals have, on several occasions, stated that MFN can apply to substantive benefits while some tribunals observed that substantive and procedural rights within IIAs are conventionally distinct. According to this, application of MFN should be confined to?the substantive benefits only. However, m

世俗

Blanch

Application of MFN to Extend the Jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunals,eir jurisdiction from the consent of states, and they are constituted by their mandate providers, the sovereign states. In this way, states subject themselves to a consensual system of investment dispute settlement by conferring power upon tribunals. Consequently, the lack of consent by a state mean