Titlebook: Animal Minds in Medieval Latin Philosophy; A Sourcebook from Au Anselm Oelze Textbook 2021 Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 Animal Cogni

Affectation

Memory, Learning, and Prudence (Albert the Great, ,, Book I, Treatise 1, Chapter 6)nds of animals based on their cognitive capacities. While all animals can engage in sensory perception (.), not all of them have memory (.), and even fewer are capable of receiving instruction (.) and of employing prudence (.). The latter was usually defined as the capacity to plan for the future ba

Vulnerable

Learning, Language, and Reasoning(Albert the Great, ,, Book 21, Treatise 1, Chapters 2–4) can be trained to follow the commands of their masters, only humans seem to be capable of learning to the extent that they engage in arts and sciences. Nevertheless, certain nonhuman animals, namely, monkeys and so-called pygmies come very close to humans because of their faculty of estimation and

CRAFT

Universal Cognition (Pseudo-Peterof Spain, , VIII) account of universal cognition. This capacity was usually taken to be a prerogative of the intellect of humans, angels, and God. However, according to Pseudo-Peter, there are good arguments to claim that nonhuman animals cognise universally insofar as they do, for instance, identify individuals on

對手

Reasoning and Thinking (Roger Bacon, ,, Part II, Distinction 3, Chapter 9)this faculty to both humans and nonhuman animals. This is noteworthy insofar as it was usually taken to be a rational faculty. Bacon, however, claims that dogs, bees, monkeys, and many other animals are endowed with it. Still, he makes clear that this does not mean that they are capable of reasoning

形容詞詞尾

Foresight and Deliberation (Roger Bacon, ,, Book II)y rational causes. However, in his commentary on Aristotle’s ., Bacon spends several pages discussing the question of why nonhuman animal behaviour that looks rational to us is not actually brought about by reason and deliberation rather than by natural instinct. In particular, he examines cases of

思鄉(xiāng)病

Inner Senses (Thomas Aquinas, ,, Part I, Question 78, Article 4)e 4, Aquinas wonders whether the sensory part of the human soul has been properly divided into a certain number of external senses, such as sight or hearing, and a certain number of so-called internal or inner senses, such as imagination, memory, and estimation. Generally speaking, the inner senses

預(yù)感

Phonophobia

法律

胎兒

Friendship, Enmity, and Fear (Albert the Great, ,, Book 8, Questions 1–3)though friendship and enmity, which are the topics of questions 1 and 2 of book 8, do not strictly speaking qualify as emotions, it is clear that they are based on certain feelings such as pleasure or fear. As Albert also emphasises, questions of the emotions are deeply intertwined with issues of co