Titlebook: Analysis of Environmental Policy in the Power Sector; Equilibrium Methods Yihsu Chen,Afzal S. Siddiqui,Makoto Tanaka Book 2020 Springer Na

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Analysis of Power System Operations with a Dominant Firm and an Oligopolistic Industry,we discuss the model of Stackelberg leader–follower oligopoly in the context of electricity markets. The structure of a Stackelberg leader firm with other follower firms that behave à la Cournot is represented by a bi-level problem. It is then recast as a mathematical program with equilibrium constr

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Investment in New Power Plants Under Environmental Policies,onal decisions for two reasons. First, the solutions of open-loop and closed-loop formulations have been shown to be equivalent under perfect competition. Second, a long-run equilibrium under perfect competition market entails the notion of the zero-profit condition unless there are significant entr

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Introduction,es to incentivize investment in and operation of renewable energy (RE) technologies?such as hydro, solar, and wind?power. Given the power sector’s contribution to GHG emissions, facilitating a transition to less-polluting forms of electricity generation is a promising pathway to a socially desirable

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Environmental Policies in the Power Sector, to various forms of regulation in order to reduce or to limit its pollution. The regulation evolves from traditional command-and-control policies?such as technology or performance standards based on engineering solutions or best-available technologies earlier to more recent implementations of marke

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Features of Power Sectors, electricity. Basic information about the behavior of these participants is summarized in the demand and supply functions (curves). We describe how individual participants make their decisions by maximizing consumer or producer surplus. We next show the aggregated outcome of individually heterogenou

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Analysis of Power System Operations with a Dominant Firm and an Oligopolistic Industry,ble to price manipulation by strategic generating companies. Particularly, a dominant firm, often a large incumbent generator, may exert market power not only in electricity markets but also in related markets such as emission permit markets. This chapter extends the models without any dominant firm

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