Titlebook: An Institutional Theory of Law; New Approaches to Le Neil MacCormick,Ota Weinberger Book 1986 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 1986 jus

BANAL

The Limits of Rationality in Legal Reasoning,ch govern our practical, communal life, and of systems of thought (schemes of speculative reflection and discourse) the first virtue is rationality. Without rationality, there may be praxis, but in it there will be no system; without rationality, thought perhaps, but in it no system.

Harpoon

exophthalmos

apropos

intolerance

離開就切除

The Norm as Thought and as Reality,ve disciplines. Yet the search for the philosophical underpinnings of such disciplines, a search which, despite all exertions, perennially yields a running diversity of opinions and positions, must prompt the question: why keep puzzling over this? Is this intellectual endeavour not foredoomed to fai

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Law as Institutional Fact,has called himself ‘a(chǎn) realist’, nobody has ever announced an intention to indulge in unrealistic jurisprudence, and it seems a safe bet that nobody will, at least not so long as the subject continues to be a source of gainful employment. The problem we all face is not whether to be realistic, but ho

Enteropathic

Facts and Fact-Descriptions,like ‘What is a historical fact?’. ‘What is a social fact?’ The essential point of these speculations is to explore certain questions of great importance for the methodology of the historical and social sciences, questions concerning the relevancy of various factors in the flux of events to the char

豐滿有漂亮

On Analytical Jurisprudence, in due course discloses, the text in its present form. derives from a paper read at the College of Law of the University of Saskatchewan. In taking as its principal focus of discussion the topic of analytical jurisprudence, it deliberately raises questions about legal education and study in a point

考得

Beyond Positivism and Natural Law,tion — even when it is only meant as a first, rough division of the flied — is evidence for the fact that the legal positivist and the natural law conceptions are viewed as fundamentally opposed ideal types. It may therefore seem rather presumptuous of me to present a plea on behalf of a position in