Titlebook: An Epistemic Foundation for Scientific Realism; Defending Realism Wi John Wright Book 2018 Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018 Scientific R

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Studien zur Kommunikationswissenschaftities . than those we are capable of observing. But, of course, Eddington inferences can also take us “outwards”, to claims about states of affairs larger than those we can observe. To refer once again to the example of the fish trap of Chap. ., if we blindly set the holes of the trap to exactly fou

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Normative Interessenorganisationen,In this chapter we continue the task of defending Scientific Realism against threats and challenges. In particular, in this chapter we consider:

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Normative Interessenorganisationen,The aim of this chapter is to explore and defend a route to realism about unobservable entities that does not use inference to the best explanation.

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Die Organisation der Solidarit?tLet us begin by reviewing the main results of the previous chapter. It was argued that, provided certain conditions are met, we can construct a purely probabilistic inference to some scientific realist claims. To recap, it was argued that we are justified in adopting realism with respect to some theory T if:

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Die Organisation der Solidarit?ts?– postulated by the theory exist and behave (more or less) as the theory says they do. It is an ontological or, perhaps, metaphysical thesis. A philosopher who is a Scientific Realist about, for example, a theory of electrons might hold that electrons exist and behave more or less as the theory says they?do.

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