Titlebook: An Economic Analysis of Bilateral Investment Treaties; Jan Peter Sasse Book 2011 Gabler Verlag | Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, Wiesb

一個(gè)攪動不安

PLUMP

BITs and Transparency,e core of the argument lies the functioning of international law and the fact that reputational losses are not zero but negative-sum to the parties. It will become clear why parties, apart from the desire to protect business secrets, often prefer confidentiality and under which circumstances it migh

NAIVE

Summary and Outlook,, hands-tying and union. Additionally, in the context of FDI, investors may buy insurance, actively devaluate the assets to avoid expropriation and engage in lobbying. Forceful mechanisms to achieve cooperation in a trust game are, under certain circumstances, also what have been called here ., most

RAG

synchronous

An Economic Analysis of Bilateral Investment Treaties978-3-8349-6185-3

yohimbine

Die Internationale Rechtsgemeinschaft,rtfolio Investment (FPI). To be classified as FDI, it does not matter if the direct investment enterprise is incorporated in the foreign country, and is thus a subsidiary or associate company, or not incorporated and is thus a branch. A frequent distinction with regard to FDI is between flows and st

heartburn

,Staatsautorit?t und Rechtsautorit?t,omics will be introduced (section 4.3) and the main findings of this method will be applied to international investment law (section 4.4). Special focus will be given to the commitment and signalling properties of BITs. These properties will be checked against the existing empirical research on the

膽小懦夫

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-0600-7World Governance Indicators as the dependent variable over the time period 1996 to 2007 for non-OECD countries. The number of BITs and changes in domestic regulation in the field of investment are utilised as independent variables. The analysis further controls for GDP per capita, FDI inflows, trade

Ankylo-

Die Internationale Rechtsgemeinschaft,e core of the argument lies the functioning of international law and the fact that reputational losses are not zero but negative-sum to the parties. It will become clear why parties, apart from the desire to protect business secrets, often prefer confidentiality and under which circumstances it migh

CAGE