Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; Third International Spyros Kontogiannis,Elias Koutsoupias,Paul G. Spir Conference proceedings 2010 Springer-Verla

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-39685-8 game is one where natural distributed dynamics, such as better-response dynamics, cannot enter .. We establish a novel link between such games and the existence of pure Nash equilibria in subgames. Specifically, we show that the existence of a . pure Nash equilibrium in every . implies the weak acy

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,Soll man seinen Vorg?nger verklagen?,specified by an undirected edge-weighted graph: nodes are players, an outcome of the game is a partition of the nodes into coalitions, and the utility of a node is the sum of incident edge weights in the same coalition. We consider several natural stability requirements defined in the economics lite

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