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Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 12th International S Dimitris Fotakis,Evangelos Markakis Conference proceedings 2019 Springer Nature Switzerland A

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樓主: 使作嘔
51#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 11:24:14 | 只看該作者
Der Anti-Stress-Trainer für FührungsfrauenTherefore, giving the seller absolute freedom over the design space results in absurd conclusions; competing with the optimal mechanism is hopeless. Instead, in this paper we study four broad classes of mechanisms, each characterized by a distinct use of randomness. Our goal is twofold: to explore t
52#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 13:17:31 | 只看該作者
53#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 20:30:44 | 只看該作者
54#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 23:16:33 | 只看該作者
Kleine Stresskunde: Das Adrenalinzeitalter,how that if players can use arbitrary Turing machines to compute their strategies, then every computational game has an .-Nash equilibrium. These results may shed light on competitive settings where the availability of more running time or faster algorithms can lead to a “computational arms race”, p
55#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-31 04:14:43 | 只看該作者
Kleine Stresskunde: Das Adrenalinzeitalter,ng if a game has a rational valued Nash equilibrium. These results also hold for 3-player zero-sum games..Our proof methodology applies to corresponding decision problems about symmetric Nash equilibria in symmetric games as well, and in particular our new results carry over to the symmetric setting
56#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-31 05:18:16 | 只看該作者
Der Anti-Stress-Trainer für Juristenes where the Stackelberg Equilibria can be computed efficiently if the Nash equilibrium in its zero-sum form could be computed efficiently, in general, structural properties that allow for efficient computation of Nash equilibrium in zero-sum games are not sufficient for computing Stackelberg equili
57#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-31 09:17:51 | 只看該作者
58#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-31 16:41:20 | 只看該作者
59#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-31 19:59:39 | 只看該作者
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