Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 15th International S Panagiotis Kanellopoulos,Maria Kyropoulou,Alexandr Conference proceedings 2022 The Editor(s)

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How Bad is the?Merger Paradox?e a decline in their overall profit compared to their total pre-merger profit. This phenomenon is more striking in small oligopolistic markets, where mergers increase market concentration and may hence trigger a substantial increase in prices. In this paper, we investigate the severity of the merger

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Lookahead Auctions with?Poolingd more fair than the optimal auction. Indeed, it anonymously selects a provisional winner by a symmetric ascending-price process, and only then uses a personalized posted price. A . auction extracts at least 1/2 of the optimal revenue, even under a correlated value distribution. This bound is tight,

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Budget Feasible Mechanisms for?Procurement Auctions with?Divisible Agentsed fractionally, there exists an optimal mechanism with approximation guarantee . under the small bidder assumption. We study the divisible case without the small bidder assumption, but assume that the true costs of the agents are bounded by the budget. This setting lends itself to modeling economic

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Simultaneous Contests with?Equal Sharing Allocation of?Prizes: Computational Complexity and?Price ofisfy some contest-specific criterion, and the value of this prize to a winner decreases as the number of winners increases. The players produce outputs for a set of activities, and the winning criteria of the contests are based on these outputs. We consider two variations of the model: (i) players h