Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 7th International Sy Ron Lavi Conference proceedings 2014 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 algorithmic mecha

Postmenopause

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-26465-2ite graph have capacities and vertices have quotas to fill. Here we investigate the case of uncoordinated processes in stable allocation instances. In this setting, a feasible allocation is given and the aim is to reach a stable allocation by raising the value of the allocation along blocking edges

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-47410-1 existing work, in which it is assumed that the player utility is monotone in the number of participants working on their project, we consider non-monotone player utilities. Such utilities could result, for example, from “threshold” or “phase transition” effects, when the total benefit from a projec

minimal

Chipmunk

Postoperative Schmerztherapie Teil II,get. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has to be shared between the tasks. We study strategic budget games, where the budget is shared proportionally. We also consider a variant in which the order of the strategic decisions influences the distribution of the budgets.

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W. Seeling,M. Rockemann,P. Steffenhat voters’ preferences over the candidates are determined by the Euclidean distance. A recent paper by Knoblauch [14] shows that this problem admits a polynomial-time algorithm. Knoblauch’s approach relies on the fact that a 1-Euclidean election is necessarily single-peaked, and makes use of the pr

Dislocation

Ursula Müller-Werdan,Karl Werdanyers subject to equilibrium constraints. Extending the CWE notion introduced by Feldman et al. [STOC 2013], we introduce the concept of a . (MC-CWE) as a natural relaxation of the classical Walrasian equilibrium (WE) solution concept. The only difference between a MC-CWE and a WE is the ability for

喃喃訴苦

,Postoperative übelkeit und Erbrechen,The first class is based on additive capacities or weights, and the second on the influence in a social network. While neither class holds the gross substitutes condition, we show that in both classes the existence of WEQ is guaranteed under certain restrictions, and in particular when there are onl