Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 7th International Sy Ron Lavi Conference proceedings 2014 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 algorithmic mecha

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IRK

Efficiency of Truthful and Symmetric Mechanisms in One-Sided Matchingarly interested in the well-known . mechanism. For dichotomous preferences, we first show that truthful, symmetric and optimal mechanisms exist if intractable mechanisms are allowed. We then provide a connection to online bipartite matching. Using this connection, it is possible to design truthful,

Monocle

Stable Marriage with General Preferences arbitrary binary relations, which need not be transitive nor acyclic. This generalization is practically well-motivated, and as we show, encompasses the well studied hard variant of stable marriage where preferences are allowed to have ties and to be incomplete. As a result, we prove that deciding

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躲債

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Merited

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