Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 16th International S Argyrios Deligkas,Aris Filos-Ratsikas Conference proceedings 2023 The Editor(s) (if applicabl

臆斷

Parameterized Complexity of?Gerrymandering These representatives craft and vote on legislation, incentivizing political parties to win as many districts as possible (ideally a plurality). Gerrymandering is the process by which district boundaries are manipulated to the advantage of a desired candidate or party. We study the parameterized co

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調(diào)情

Robustness of?Participatory Budgeting Outcomes: Complexity and?Experimentsity of the #.-. problem, where given a PB instance we ask for the number of ways in which we can flip a given number of approvals in the votes, so that a specific project is selected. This problem captures computing the funding probabilities of projects in case random noise is added. Unfortunately,

Genteel

Into the?Unknown: Assigning Reviewers to?Papers with?Uncertain Affinitiesaches estimate a real-valued . for each paper-reviewer pair that acts as a proxy for the quality of the match, and then assign reviewers to maximize the sum of affinity scores. Most affinity score estimation methods are inherently noisy: reviewers can only bid on a small number of papers, and textua

dearth

Diversity-Seeking Jump Games in?Networkslonging to . different types are placed at the nodes of a network. Agents can be either stubborn, in which case they will always choose their preferred location, or strategic, in which case they aim to maximize the fraction of agents of their own type in their neighborhood. In the so-called Schellin

DOTE

Maximin Fair Allocation of?Indivisible Items Under Cost Utilitiesheir .—the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as many bundles as there are agents, and receive their lowest valued bundle. An . is one where every agent receives at least their maximin fair share. We examine the existence of such allocations when agents have .. In this setting,

shrill

Defiance

EFX Allocations for?Indivisible Chores: Matching-Based Approachions is a standing open problem for both goods and chores, the understanding of the existence of EFX allocations for chores is less established compared to goods. We study the existence of EFX allocation for chores under the assumption that all agent’s cost functions are additive. Specifically, we s

STELL

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