Titlebook: Agricultural Supply Chains, Growth and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa; Market Structure, Fa Nicolas Depetris Chauvin,Guido Porto,Francis Mul

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Jan-Paul Lüdtke,Michael Fretschnerconsumption decisions of agricultural families (farms) in Africa. We are interested in modeling the production allocation of factors of production to various cash and food crops and in how this allocation depends on competition along the supply chain and on the constraints faced by different types o

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https://doi.org/10.1007/b112259ousehold survey data. The institutional arrangements for the different crops are briefly presented in Sect. .. Sections . and . present the farmgate price simulation results from the model and the household welfare simulations.

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https://doi.org/10.1007/b112259e institutional arrangements for rice and vanilla are briefly presented in Sect. 8.2. Sections 8.3 and 8.4 present the farmgate price simulation results from the model and the household welfare simulations.

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Jan Miller-Heyl,David MacPhee,Janet J. Fritzly (between members and other value chain actors, inside or outside the community). These organizations can reduce transaction costs by creating economies of scale for input supply, technological transfer, or joint marketing, or by facilitating concerted action between farmers (Staal et al. 1998). E

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,DARE to be You Children’s Program,s written on the topic in the immediate aftermath of publication, Olson’s basic reasoning lies at the root of the recent rapid expansion of social-network literature in economics. Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Manski (1993, 2000) survey a range of contexts in which social networks have been used to e

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Jan Miller-Heyl,David MacPhee,Janet J. FritzThis chapter analyzes the case of Zambia. We describe the household survey (Sect. 5.1), the food and cash crops institutional arrangements (Sect. 5.2) and we present the farmgate price simulation results from the model (Sect. 5.3) and the household welfare simulations (Sect. 5.4).

干涉

https://doi.org/10.1007/b112259This chapter studies how farm constraints and market structure affects households’ welfare in Ethiopia. We describe the household survey data (Sect. 6.1), the food and cash crops institutional arrangements (Sect. 6.2) and we present the farmgate price simulation results from the model (Sect. 6.3) and the household welfare simulations (Sect. 6.4).

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The Case of TanzaniaThis chapter analyzes the case of Tanzania. We describe the household survey (Sect. 3.1), the food and cash crops institutional arrangements (Sect. 3.2) and we present the simulation results from the model (Sect. 3.3) and the household welfare simulations (Sect. 3.4).