Titlebook: Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V; Designing Mechanisms Peyman Faratin,David C. Parkes,William E. Walsh Conference proceedings 2004 Spri

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Monolithic

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A Decommitment Strategy in a Competitive Multi-agent Transportation Settingr utility levels in case of negotiations with uncertainty about future prospects. In this paper, we study the decommitment concept for the novel setting of a large-scale logistics setting with multiple, competing companies. Orders for transportation of loads are acquired by agents of the (competing)

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Mechanism for Optimally Trading Off Revenue and Efficiency in Multi-unit Auctionspending on the objective of the seller, different selling mechanisms are desirable. The Vickrey auction with a truthful reserve price is optimal when the objective is efficiency – allocating the units to the parties who values them the most. The Myerson auction is optimal when the objective is the s

Extricate

Choosing Samples to Compute Heuristic-Strategy Nash Equilibriumtrategy space is often populated with ., such as myopic best-response to prices. Given these heuristic strategies, it can be useful to evaluate the strategies and the auction design by computing a Nash equilibrium across the restricted strategy space. First, it is necessary to compute the expected p

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