Titlebook: Agency Theory and Executive Pay; The Remuneration Com Alexander Pepper Book 2019 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exc

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Gum-Disease

What a Public Corporation Really Is,to why this assumption is incorrect, explains why public corporations should be regarded in ontological terms as real entities, and spells out why this matters—the consequences for agency theory as a whole and the particular consequences for shareholders and directors.

阻塞

Executive Pay as a Collective Action Problem,rnance of companies. It explains why shareholders of public corporations are unlikely to solve executive pay problems because of a collective action problem, and how ideas about the governance of common pool resources have implications for the design of corporate governance mechanisms. A study of th

companion

Behavioural Agency Theory,ock programmes is based on an outdated set of assumptions about human behaviour and executive agency. It describes a revised theory of agency and a modified design framework for executive pay plans based on developments in behavioural science.

Flirtatious

ritique of the three main premises on which the model is bas.This new book examines the relationship between agency theory and executive pay. It argues that while Jensen and Meckling (1976) were right in their analysis of the agency problem in public corporations they were wrong about the proposed s

SPALL

Neonatal

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-9687-9roblem, and how ideas about the governance of common pool resources have implications for the design of corporate governance mechanisms. A study of the FTSE 100 is used to illustrate the points raised.

闖入

,What’s Wrong With Agency Theory?,ecause of the different interests of shareholders and managers; that man is rational, self-interested, and rent-seeking and there is no non-pecuniary agent motivation. A case study of AstraZeneca is used to illustrate some of the points.

NIL

Executive Pay as a Collective Action Problem,roblem, and how ideas about the governance of common pool resources have implications for the design of corporate governance mechanisms. A study of the FTSE 100 is used to illustrate the points raised.

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