Titlebook: Advances in Dynamic Games; Applications to Econ Andrzej S. Nowak,Krzysztof Szajowski Book 2005 Birkh?user Boston 2005 Markov.agents.algorit

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書目名稱Advances in Dynamic Games影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Advances in Dynamic Games影響因子(影響力)學科排名




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書目名稱Advances in Dynamic Games網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學科排名




書目名稱Advances in Dynamic Games被引頻次




書目名稱Advances in Dynamic Games被引頻次學科排名




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書目名稱Advances in Dynamic Games年度引用學科排名




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書目名稱Advances in Dynamic Games讀者反饋學科排名

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Kerstin Stolzenberg,Krischan Heberlefuzzy max order. For both players, our aim is to find the equilibrium point of a payoff function. The approach depends on the interval analysis, that is, manipulating a class of sets arising from α-cut of fuzzy sets. We construct an equilibrium fuzzy stopping time under some conditions.

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2474-0179 s for researchers and practitioners who use game theory for .This book?focuses on various aspects of dynamic game theory, presenting state-of-the-art?research and serving as a guide to the vitality and growth?of the field and its applications. The selected chapters, written by experts in their respe

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Ausl?ser von Unternehmenswandel decisions in a given period, and (ii) .—the endowment of each agent is in proportion, possibly random, to the total endowment. When these conditions hold, there is a stationary equilibrium. When they do not hold, such an equilibrium need not exist.

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Andrzej S. Nowak,Krzysztof SzajowskiPresents state-of-the-art research and serves as a guide to the vitality and growth of game theory and its applications.Features useful tools for researchers and practitioners who use game theory for