Titlebook: A Theory of Legal Sentences; Manuel Atienza,Juan Ruiz Manero,Francisco J. Lapor Book 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998 Conceptualist Th

向前變橢圓

定點(diǎn)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-59992-7he main positions on this matter in contemporary legal theory, and then develop our own conception. Our central point will be that with respect to permissions one must distinguish three contexts: that of rules regulating ‘natural’ conduct, that of power-conferring rules, and that of legal principles.

Inelasticity

febrile

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0848-8Conceptualist Thesis; Mandatory Norms; Non-Peremptory Reasons; Peremptory Reasons; Permissive Sentences;

獨(dú)白

978-94-010-3738-9Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

CRATE

北極熊

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-59992-7tutive rules and definitions, we will now set out to examine permissive sentences. In order to do this, we will first present what, in our view, are the main positions on this matter in contemporary legal theory, and then develop our own conception. Our central point will be that with respect to per

Bombast

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-59992-7ply the assumption of “values regarded as categorical reasons with respect to any interest”. Therefore, we said, norms transporting those values — i. e., principles in the strict sense — always prevail over policies and play a predominantly negative role: they prevent that the pursuit of some intere

楓樹

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-59992-7ts of. In this chapter, our aim is rather to examine that machinery as a whole. As is commonly known, in the legal theory of the positivist tradition, the unity of the legal system has been seen as a correlate of the possibility to refer each and every one of its provisions to a single ‘master norm’

胡言亂語(yǔ)