Titlebook: A New Social Ontology of Government; Consent, Coordinatio Daniel Little Book 2020 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under ex

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外星人

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-01792-8sts, and recent innovations in organizational sociology. These ideas proceed largely from the actor-centered perspective described in Chapter?.. Recent organizational theories have given additional emphasis to the topic of organizational culture. The theory of strategic action fields holds that orga

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-01792-8ptionless rules and procedures, the world we live in would be very different. All the individuals within the organization would fulfill the assignments of their roles, and the organization would function fully as designed. However, individuals are not automata, and their interests, plans, understand

AROMA

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-01792-8ossibility of significant lack of alignment between government action and the public good. The political power of the electorate is offset by the political power and influence wielded by interested parties. Lobbying, corporate influence on legislation and regulation, manipulation of the electoral pr

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本能

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15835-5sh and implement prudent schemes of regulation of risky activities? Enforcement of regulations and policies faces many of the same obstacles considered in previous chapters: principal-agent problems within government, non-compliance by actors in civil society, and deliberate efforts at evasion of re

厚臉皮

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15835-5vernment are generated by the socially-constituted actors who make up the offices and agencies of government. Second, we can understand much of the workings of governments through the findings of institutional sociology and organizational studies. Government is an assemblage of organizations, with s

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Book 2020e? How do political institutions come to have effective causal powers in the administration of policy and regulation? What accounts for both plasticity and perseverance of political institutions and practices? And how are we to formulate a better understanding of the persistence of dysfunctions in g