Titlebook: Wireless Network Pricing; Jianwei Huang,Lin Gao Book 2013 Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2013

礦石

Anhydrous

Oligopoly Pricing,. After introducing the basic concepts of game theory following [38,39,40,41], we will look at multiple classical market competition models, including the Cournot competition based on output quantities, the Bertrand competition based on pricing, and the Hotelling model that captures the location information in the competition.

ATOPY

Wireless Communications Basics,s in wireless networks. The intention is to cover the most basic features of wireless communications and networking, in order to reduce readers’ need to consult other textbooks to understand the applications in the later chapters of this book. Most discussions in this chapter are based on the materials in [8, 9,10,11,12,13,14,15].

nonplus

巨碩

Wireless Communications Basics,ristics and channel models for wireless communications, the wireless access and networking technologies, and the radio resource management technologies in wireless networks. The intention is to cover the most basic features of wireless communications and networking, in order to reduce readers’ need

人類學(xué)家

Economics Basics,or a wireless spectrum owner, and a consumer can represent a wireless user or a lower tier wireless service provider. In later chapters, we will give more concrete examples of firms and consumers in different wireless networks. The theory introduced in this chapter closely follows several microecono

EXTOL

Social Optimal Pricing,ds to the case, for example, where the service provider’s interests are aligned with the regulator’s interests through proper economic mechanisms. The basic approach of social optimal pricing is to formulate the problem as an optimization problem, and design a dual-based distributed algorithm for th

mercenary

突變

刪減

Network Externalities,e not directly involved. In practice, however, there are many situations where external or third-party effects are important. In these situations, the third parties’ actions lead to either benefits or costs to the players who are not involved directly. In economics, these external effects are termed