Titlebook: Why Paramilitary Operations Fail; Armin Krishnan Book 2018 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018 Paramilitary operations.co

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Armin Krishnan extent of their symptoms and impairment, and informing the clinician of symptom presentation and areas of impairment in each individual patient. This chapter is designed to aid clinicians and researchers in choosing empirically driven measures to guide their clinical and research endeavors for each

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Armin Krishnanroaches have meanwhile been developed in parallel, although they were not taken into account during the initial founding phase of econometrics. A “classic” approach was instead adopted in this respect, albeit with an additional difficulty: the taking into account of time. Cliometrics initially follo

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What Are Paramilitary Operations?, book in terms of the PMOs that are considered, namely only pro-insurgency PMOs that support rebel forces or guerrillas. The chapter discusses the motivations for undertaking PMOs and the challenge of measuring the success of PMOs. It is proposed that the ultimate measure of success is the battlefie

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A Short History of US Paramilitary Operations,ix eras of covert operations: the early Cold War, the ‘golden era’ of covert operations, the Vietnam era, the post-Vietnam era, the Clinton era, and the War on Terror. It is demonstrated that PMOs have been a persistent feature of U.S. foreign policy and it is discussed how PMOs evolved over the cou

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Accountability in Paramilitary Operations,e aspect of U.S. foreign policy. The chapter provides an overview of key legislation and regulation and how it was historically put into place. It summarizes how Congress has interfered with PMOs over the years. It is argued that although no administration can hide a major PMO from Congress, there a

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Critical Loss of Control,ent in the way the U.S. government has approached PMOs in the past. There are two sets of principals (Congress and White House) and three sets of agents (national security bureaucracy, partner states, and proxy forces) in a contractor, subcontractor, and sub-subcontractor relationship, which creates