Titlebook: Web and Internet Economics; 11th International C Evangelos Markakis,Guido Sch?fer Conference proceedings 2015 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidel

膽小鬼

Computing Stable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing,blem of welfare maximization; we apply this to compute an approximately core stable solution that extracts one-fourth of the optimal social welfare for the class of subadditive valuations. We also show much stronger results for several popular sub-classes: anonymous, fractionally subadditive, and su

Orchiectomy

供過(guò)于求

Cloudburst

容易生皺紋

Spartan

擺動(dòng)

Online Allocation and Pricing with Economies of Scale,fficiently produce such an allocation with cost at most a constant factor greater than the minimum over such allocations in hindsight, so long as the marginal costs do not decrease too rapidly. We also give a bicriteria approximation to social welfare for the case of more general valuation functions

animated

Ad Exchange: Envy-Free Auctions with Mediators, We develop a game-theoretic model for the entanglement of the . auction at the ad exchange with the . auctions at the ad networks. We consider the incentives of all three involved parties and suggest a ., an extension of the Walrasian equilibrium that ensures envy-freeness for all participants. We

Simulate

Computing Approximate Nash Equilibria in Network Congestion Games with Polynomially Decreasing Costo show that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in Shapley network cost sharing games is .-complete even in undirected graphs, where previous hardness results where known only in the directed case.

Perineum

Welfare and Rationality Guarantees for the Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction,ality. We prove this bicriteria guarantee is asymptotically (almost) tight..Finally, we examine what strategies are required to ensure individual rationality in the SMRA with general valuation functions. First, we provide a weak characterization, namely ., for individual rationality. We then show th