Titlebook: Web and Internet Economics; 14th International C George Christodoulou,Tobias Harks Conference proceedings 2018 Springer Nature Switzerland

罐里有戒指

A Simple Mechanism for a Budget-Constrained Buyert seller with . heterogeneous items faces a single buyer and seeks to maximize her revenue. The buyer has a budget and additive valuations drawn independently for each item from (non-identical) distributions. We show that when the buyer’s budget is publicly known, the better of selling each item sep

Infirm

The Communication Complexity of Graphical Games on Grid Graphsd on the two dimensional . grid graph. Unlike previous works focusing on the computational complexity of centralized algorithms, we study the communication complexity of distributed protocols for these problems, in the setting that each player initially knows only his private input of constant lengt

做方舟

The Communication Complexity of Graphical Games on Grid Graphsd on the two dimensional . grid graph. Unlike previous works focusing on the computational complexity of centralized algorithms, we study the communication complexity of distributed protocols for these problems, in the setting that each player initially knows only his private input of constant lengt

Lymphocyte

Approximating the Existential Theory of the Realsmials. We propose the approximate existential theory of the reals (.-ETR), in which the constraints only need to be satisfied approximately. We first show that unconstrained .-ETR = ETR, and then study the .-ETR problem when the solution is constrained to lie in a given convex set. Our main theorem

英寸

Approximating the Existential Theory of the Realsmials. We propose the approximate existential theory of the reals (.-ETR), in which the constraints only need to be satisfied approximately. We first show that unconstrained .-ETR = ETR, and then study the .-ETR problem when the solution is constrained to lie in a given convex set. Our main theorem

Apoptosis

Pricing Multi-unit Marketslower bounds on the largest fraction of the optimal social welfare that can be guaranteed with posted prices, under a range of assumptions about the designer’s information and agents’ valuations. Our results provide insights about the relative power of uniform and non-uniform prices, the relative di

柔軟

Optimal Pricing for MHR Distributionsfor a single item. We show that for the natural class of Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR) distributions, offering the same, take-it-or-leave-it price to all bidders can achieve an (asymptotically) optimal revenue. In particular, the approximation ratio is shown to be ., matched by a tight lower bound for

惡心

發(fā)酵劑

Asparagus