Titlebook: Wanting and Intending; Elements of a Philos Neil Roughley Book 2016 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016 Question of Motivational

吵鬧

拔出

Wanting*, Consciousness and Affector this reason, it remains the phenomenon that allows us to get a conceptual grip on our optative attitudes. This is the case, even though agents may sometimes be mistaken as to whether they “really want” something, a mistake whose possibility depends on the fact that the latter phrase generally pic

一條卷發(fā)

Wanting*, Consciousness and Affector this reason, it remains the phenomenon that allows us to get a conceptual grip on our optative attitudes. This is the case, even though agents may sometimes be mistaken as to whether they “really want” something, a mistake whose possibility depends on the fact that the latter phrase generally pic

法官

Intention, Belief and the Irreducibility Thesisher, intention, I claim, in agreement with Bratman and Mele, has only an extremely weak negative doxastic condition. What is decisive is, however, the explanation of this condition. Here I follow Aristotle, for whom the doxastic condition on prohairesis derives from the identical doxastic condition

貪婪地吃

Intention, Belief and the Irreducibility Thesisher, intention, I claim, in agreement with Bratman and Mele, has only an extremely weak negative doxastic condition. What is decisive is, however, the explanation of this condition. Here I follow Aristotle, for whom the doxastic condition on prohairesis derives from the identical doxastic condition

無節(jié)奏

Synapse

The Intentional Syndrome: Characteristic Causal Features and Rational Requirementsst Wedgewood’s and Broome’s claim that rationality necessarily supervenes on the mind. One reason why the supervenience thesis is false is that perhaps the most basic . requirement concerns executive consistency, i.e., is a principle one of whose relata is not an attitude, but an action. I defend th

deciduous

Ordnance

Communicate