Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; 6th International Co MHR Khouzani,Emmanouil Panaousis,George Theodorako Conference proceedings 2015

只看該作者 · 發(fā)表于 2025-3-24 21:23:41

A Game Theoretic Model for Defending Against Stealthy Attacks with Limited Resourcesudy the Nash Equilibria of the game. We further study a sequential game where the defender first announces its strategy and the attacker then responds accordingly, and design an algorithm that finds a nearly optimal strategy for the defender to commit to.

只看該作者 · 發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 02:21:04

Passivity-Based Distributed Strategies for Stochastic Stackelberg Security Gamesended by any other agent. We analyze this strategy via a passivity-based approach and formulate sufficient conditions for the probability distribution of the set of defended targets to converge to a Stackelberg equilibrium. We then derive bounds on the deviation between the utility of the system pri

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