標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Strategy and Game Theory; Practice Exercises w Felix Munoz-Garcia,Daniel Toro-Gonzalez Textbook 2019Latest edition Springer Nature Switzerl [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: Gram114 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 18:48
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Strategy and Game Theory影響因子(影響力)
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Strategy and Game Theory影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Strategy and Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Strategy and Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Strategy and Game Theory被引頻次
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書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Strategy and Game Theory讀者反饋
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Strategy and Game Theory讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 注意 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 23:00
Felix Munoz-Garcia,Daniel Toro-Gonzalezcludes selected coverage. The author is a professor of Statistics and adjunct professor of Mathematics at the University of Washington in Seattle. He served as 978-0-387-22760-3Series ISSN 1431-875X Series E-ISSN 2197-4136 作者: Respond 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 02:03 作者: APEX 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 07:09 作者: Panther 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 11:20 作者: Flounder 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 12:56
nts from engineering, economics, physics, computer sciences, and mathematics..?.Erhan Cinlar has received many awards for excellence in teaching, including the President’s Award for Distingu978-1-4614-2812-1978-0-387-87859-1Series ISSN 0072-5285 Series E-ISSN 2197-5612 作者: Coterminous 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 17:12
2192-4333 omparisons at each point of the analysis. ?In addition, exercises are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise number. This allows students to pace their studies and instru978-3-030-11902-7Series ISSN 2192-4333 Series E-ISSN 2192-4341 作者: 盡管 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 22:19
Felix Munoz-Garcia,Daniel Toro-Gonzalezdes coverage of censored data martingales. The text includes measure theoretic preliminaries, from which the authors own course typically includes selected coverage. The author is a professor of Statistics and adjunct professor of Mathematics at the University of Washington in Seattle. He served as 作者: peptic-ulcer 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 01:22 作者: Solace 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 08:17 作者: 狂熱語(yǔ)言 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 11:22 作者: OTTER 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 13:57
Felix Munoz-Garcia,Daniel Toro-Gonzalezdes coverage of censored data martingales. The text includes measure theoretic preliminaries, from which the authors own course typically includes selected coverage. The author is a professor of Statistics and adjunct professor of Mathematics at the University of Washington in Seattle. He served as 作者: 沐浴 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 20:59 作者: DEVIL 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 00:36 作者: Cardioversion 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 06:06 作者: 男生戴手銬 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 08:35
Textbook 2019Latest editioncluding graphical illustrations to focus students’ attention on the most relevant payoff comparisons at each point of the analysis. ?In addition, exercises are ranked according to their difficulty, with a letter (A-C) next to the exercise number. This allows students to pace their studies and instru作者: vector 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 11:39
Applications to Industrial Organization,game of price competition between two symmetric firms, where we use several figures to illustrate our discussion. We then extend our explanation to settings in which firms are allowed to exhibit different costs.作者: Agronomy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 16:45 作者: recession 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 20:21 作者: upstart 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 01:17 作者: Nibble 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 05:50
2192-4333 required in most courses at the undergraduate level and gradThis textbook presents worked-out exercises on game theory with detailed step-by-step explanations. While most textbooks on game theory focus on theoretical results, this book focuses on providing practical examples in which students can le作者: 建筑師 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 08:03 作者: 機(jī)密 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 12:30 作者: 帶來(lái) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 16:32 作者: Spangle 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 23:17
Simultaneous-Move Games with Incomplete Information,eristic, such as the state of market demand, or its production costs; while other players cannot observe this information. In this setting, we still identify players’ best responses, but we need to condition them on the available information that every player observes when formulating its optimal st作者: Rejuvenate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 00:56
Auctions, apply the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) solution concept learned in Chap. ., since competing bidders are informed about their private valuation for the object but are commonly uninformed about each other’s valuations. Since, in addition, bidders are asked to simultaneously submit their bids under作者: 欺騙手段 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 07:05
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Signaling Games, for players’ actions to convey or conceal the information they privately observe to players acting in subsequent stages and who did not have access to such information (uninformed players). That is, we explore the possibility that players’ actions may signal certain information to other players act作者: 沙文主義 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 10:58 作者: BOLT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 13:34 作者: champaign 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 16:56
Simultaneous-Move Games with Incomplete Information,rategy. Once we find the (conditional) best responses for each player, we are able to describe the Nash equilibria arising under incomplete information (the so-called Bayesian Nash equilibria, BNE) of the game; as the vector of strategies simultaneously satisfying all best responses.作者: 沐浴 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 23:49 作者: 字的誤用 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 03:31
Felix Munoz-Garcia,Daniel Toro-Gonzalezillustrates this intention clearly. The material to be presented in the classroom constitutes a bit more than half the text, and the choices the author makes at the University of Washington in Seattle are spelled out. The rest of the text provides background, offers different routes that could be pu作者: Expressly 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 06:42 作者: overrule 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 09:58 作者: 不發(fā)音 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 15:58
Felix Munoz-Garcia,Daniel Toro-Gonzalezillustrates this intention clearly. The material to be presented in the classroom constitutes a bit more than half the text, and the choices the author makes at the University of Washington in Seattle are spelled out. The rest of the text provides background, offers different routes that could be pu作者: GEAR 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 19:31 作者: 北極熊 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 23:11 作者: ICLE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 05:53 作者: 喃喃而言 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 09:25 作者: Locale 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 12:13
Felix Munoz-Garcia,Daniel Toro-Gonzalezillustrates this intention clearly. The material to be presented in the classroom constitutes a bit more than half the text, and the choices the author makes at the University of Washington in Seattle are spelled out. The rest of the text provides background, offers different routes that could be pu作者: 顯而易見(jiàn) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 14:49 作者: recede 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 19:46
Felix Munoz-Garcia,Daniel Toro-Gonzalez examples illustrates this intention clearly. The material to be presented in the classroom constitutes a bit more than half the text, and the choices the author makes at the University of Washington in Seattle are spelled out. The rest of the text provides background, offers different routes that c作者: KEGEL 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 01:48
Felix Munoz-Garcia,Daniel Toro-Gonzalez examples illustrates this intention clearly. The material to be presented in the classroom constitutes a bit more than half the text, and the choices the author makes at the University of Washington in Seattle are spelled out. The rest of the text provides background, offers different routes that c作者: doxazosin 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 03:55
illustrates this intention clearly. The material to be presented in the classroom constitutes a bit more than half the text, and the choices the author makes at the University of Washington in Seattle are spelled out. The rest of the text provides background, offers different routes that could be pu作者: 甜瓜 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 11:16 作者: BUMP 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 13:09 作者: 忘川河 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 18:27 作者: STALL 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 20:50
Repeated Games and Correlated Equilibria,In this chapter we explore agents’ incentives to cooperate when they interact in infinite repetitions of a stage game, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma game or the Cournot oligopoly game. Repeated interactions between the same group of individuals, or repeated competition between the same group of firms in a given industry, are fairly common.
