標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Scissors and Rock; Game Theory for Thos Manfred J. Holler,Barbara Klose-Ullmann Book 2020 Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 strategic dec [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: Agoraphobia 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 18:04
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Scissors and Rock影響因子(影響力)
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Scissors and Rock影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Scissors and Rock網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Scissors and Rock網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Scissors and Rock被引頻次
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Scissors and Rock被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Scissors and Rock年度引用
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Scissors and Rock年度引用學(xué)科排名
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Scissors and Rock讀者反饋
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Scissors and Rock讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: EVADE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 23:20
http://image.papertrans.cn/s/image/862839.jpg作者: 陶瓷 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 02:39
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44823-3strategic decision problems; strategic behaviour and game theory; decision making and game theory; auct作者: 免除責(zé)任 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 05:49
978-3-030-44822-6Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020作者: 冒號(hào) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 12:38 作者: 該得 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 13:46 作者: Apraxia 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 20:14 作者: 性滿(mǎn)足 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 00:25
,The Prisoners’ Dilemma, but Who Are the Players?,sions. Mr. Taubman served ten months of a one-year prison sentence; Ms. Brooks was given six months’ house arrest, a $350,000 fine, and 1000?h of community service. She pleaded guilty to price-fixing and then testified against her boss, Alfred Taubman. No one was charged at Christie’s, which had blo作者: finite 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 05:27
Which Strategy to Choose?,cases a singleton is left. In contrast to this operation, the concept of rationalizable strategies leads to an expansion of the set of justifiable strategy choices. A strategy x is rationalizable if it is a best reply to strategy y and y is a best reply to a strategy z. In a Nash equilibrium (x, y),作者: Heart-Rate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 07:51
Forever and a Day,wing periods as long as the strategy of the opponent chooses “cooperate.” However, if the strategy selects “defect,” then TIT-FOR TAT presents “defect” as well. The strategy resulting in the . of payoff points wins. This condition is different than what defines success in the Iterated Prisoners’ Dil作者: 災(zāi)禍 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 11:27 作者: brassy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 16:18
peration to illustrate practical applications. Readers learn to apply game theory in business and in daily life – to manage their decision problems and to better understand the decision problems of others..978-3-030-44822-6978-3-030-44823-3作者: Geyser 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 18:29
lay important roles in the dynamics of the total system, which makes the dynamics of the system complicated one. For better understanding such dynamics, it is necessary, at the first step, to conduct investigations in a simplified system such as without any thermal coupling.作者: 百靈鳥(niǎo) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 22:28
Manfred J. Holler,Barbara Klose-Ullmannmbustors and combustion processes in engineering- a very specialized topic of current interest. This requires understanding complex, reacting, multiphase flows and their computations by large eddy simulation (LES). For this purpose, special attention is devoted in understanding waves in reacting flo作者: Assignment 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 06:03 作者: CRAMP 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 08:05 作者: acrobat 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 13:35
Manfred J. Holler,Barbara Klose-Ullmannon of work in this field which would take advantage of the latest physico-chemical methods. The present work contains instability constants for 1,381 complex compounds. We have considered it convenient to preface the summary of the instability constants with an introductory section of a general theo作者: 不要不誠(chéng)實(shí) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 18:26 作者: Ledger 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 21:02
Manfred J. Holler,Barbara Klose-Ullmannffects and their asymptotic fate, and we find transient wavepacket that develop almost identically in the stable and unstable cases. Finally, we compare these results with the simulation including the pipe in the computational domain finding the latter one to be much more unstable.作者: BARK 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 23:57 作者: Fulsome 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 07:22
Manfred J. Holler,Barbara Klose-Ullmannffects and their asymptotic fate, and we find transient wavepacket that develop almost identically in the stable and unstable cases. Finally, we compare these results with the simulation including the pipe in the computational domain finding the latter one to be much more unstable.作者: Crayon 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 08:14
Manfred J. Holler,Barbara Klose-Ullmannffects and their asymptotic fate, and we find transient wavepacket that develop almost identically in the stable and unstable cases. Finally, we compare these results with the simulation including the pipe in the computational domain finding the latter one to be much more unstable.作者: BLANC 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 13:30 作者: colony 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 16:49
plants [Lahey & Drew 1980]. On the other hand, the dynamic behavior and/or flow instabilities in cryogenic systems have been investigated only in a limited range of experiments so far [Friedly et al. 1979, Hands 1979, Akagawa et al. 1989. Fukuda et al. 1984 and so on]. Recently, increasing attention作者: 颶風(fēng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 22:33 作者: 精美食品 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 00:30 作者: 直言不諱 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 07:34
Manfred J. Holler,Barbara Klose-Ullmann complex-formation in solution. Instability constants characterize quantitatively the equili- bria in solutions of complex compounds and are extensively used by chemists of widely-varying specialities, in analytical chemistry, electrochemistry, the technology of non-ferrous and rare metals, etc., fo作者: Rheumatologist 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 10:00 作者: Magisterial 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 14:47
Manfred J. Holler,Barbara Klose-Ullmann complex-formation in solution. Instability constants characterize quantitatively the equili- bria in solutions of complex compounds and are extensively used by chemists of widely-varying specialities, in analytical chemistry, electrochemistry, the technology of non-ferrous and rare metals, etc., fo作者: 音的強(qiáng)弱 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 20:06 作者: Ambiguous 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 22:18 作者: Parley 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 01:36
Manfred J. Holler,Barbara Klose-Ullmann the global linear stability analysis adopting a time-stepper method. For the simplified setup neglecting a meshed pipe in the simulations, we compare results of the fully-spectral code . with the spectral-element code .. We find the calculated critical value . for the first bifurcation to be depend作者: 致敬 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 08:05 作者: obstruct 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 11:38
Manfred J. Holler,Barbara Klose-Ullmann the global linear stability analysis adopting a time-stepper method. For the simplified setup neglecting a meshed pipe in the simulations, we compare results of the fully-spectral code . with the spectral-element code .. We find the calculated critical value . for the first bifurcation to be depend作者: auxiliary 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 17:09
Manfred J. Holler,Barbara Klose-Ullmannvated by the aeronautics, naval, automotive and wind-energy .This book contains the outcome of the international meeting on instability, control and noise generated by massive flow separation that was organized at the Monash Center, in Prato, Italy, September 4-6, 2013..The meeting served as the fin作者: 顛簸地移動(dòng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 20:33
cally for channel flows at high Reynolds numbers. Several kinds of nonlinear interaction, dependent on the input amplitudes and wavenumbers or on previously occurring interactions, are found and are inter-related. The first, Type a, is studied the most here and it usually produces span wise focusing作者: Stagger 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 22:05 作者: 空氣 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 03:21 作者: NAG 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 06:51
Chaos, Too Many and Too Few,t outcome. In the Volunteer’s Dilemma, coordination is likely to fail because players want to profit off “somebody else” volunteering. The dilemma implies that you only benefit from the volunteering of others if you do not volunteer yourself.作者: 套索 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 14:30
Playing for Susan, and a . are discussed to illustrate the essence of a game—with respect to understanding the functioning of markets. The example of Microsoft’s . challenging Netscape’s . by now historical, serves to demonstrate that in a strategic decision situation an agent cannot choose an outcome, independent of作者: 揮舞 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 16:58
No Mathematics,.” The basic concepts of game theory are discussed making use of the fundamental operations of summing up, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing. It is suggested that readers become familiar with concepts such as sets, functions, and vectors. These concepts help to make the message of the text more作者: Modicum 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 21:17 作者: AVOID 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 02:54
The Nash Equilibrium,ments such as . (CKR) and .-. (CAB) are discussed. A historical note on Nash and his equilibrium concept accompanies the definition, including a reference to the movie “Beautiful Mind.” For illustration, the concept is applied to the QWERTY-DSK game of standardization—and to the Kama Sutra.作者: nutrients 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 04:07 作者: DALLY 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 09:53
Chaos, Too Many and Too Few,ame, an (equilibrium) outcome can be expected featuring a Market B, without sellers, while too many sellers crowd Market A, resulting in an inefficient outcome. In the Volunteer’s Dilemma, coordination is likely to fail because players want to profit off “somebody else” volunteering. The dilemma imp作者: 簡(jiǎn)潔 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 12:56 作者: hemorrhage 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 18:09 作者: Pelvic-Floor 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 21:05 作者: 郊外 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 01:54
Mixed Strategies and Expected Utility, Kahneman-Tversky, and numerous experimental results. Here, it is applied as a theoretical tool to discuss the peculiarities of the Nash equilibrium when it is mixed as, e.g., in the Inspection Game. It is demonstrated that in the Nash equilibrium the strategy of player 1 is exclusively determined b作者: DUCE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 04:53 作者: Simulate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 10:38
Bargaining and Bargaining Games,is determined (1) by the shrinking of the cake to be distributed among the two players and (2) by how the shrinking is evaluated by the players. If players can make ., then the self-enforcing power of the equilibrium is no longer needed. The players can jointly decide on feasible payoffs to serve as作者: 1分開(kāi) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 16:08
,Goethe’s Price Games, Auctions, and Other Surprises,n that bidding one’s willingness-to-pay price is an optimal strategy. We do not know whether Goethe had a similar result in mind. In fact, his sealed-bid price functioned like a take-it-or-leave-it option. Given the historical circumstances, it implied price-fixing, thereby avoiding explicit bargain作者: Temporal-Lobe 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 20:18 作者: 營(yíng)養(yǎng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 23:12 作者: 簡(jiǎn)略 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 03:41 作者: In-Situ 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 07:57
Book 2020e.g., Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Adam Smith, and Goethe, and includes cases of conflict and cooperation to illustrate practical applications. Readers learn to apply game theory in business and in daily life – to manage their decision problems and to better understand the decision problems of others..作者: Decline 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 12:24
Mixed Strategies and Expected Utility,f player i depends exclusively on the payoffs of i. Arthur Miller’s “The Crucible,” the Stag Hunt Game, and Peter Handke’s “The Goalie’s Anxiety at the Penalty Kick” illustrate the results of this chapter.
