標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Game Theory; A Multi-Leveled Appr Hans Peters Textbook 20081st edition Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008 Applications of Game Theory.N [打印本頁] 作者: 乳缽 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 16:24
書目名稱Game Theory影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Game Theory影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory被引頻次
書目名稱Game Theory被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory年度引用
書目名稱Game Theory年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theory讀者反饋
書目名稱Game Theory讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: ostensible 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 21:39
Finite Games with Incomplete Information are the marginal probability distributions derived from a basic commonly known distribution over all combinations of player types..In this chapter we consider games with finitely many players, finitely many types, and finitely many strategies. These games can be either static (simultaneous, one-sho作者: 橫條 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 02:53
Noncooperative Games: Extensionsbrium (Bayesian Nash equilibrium) can be applied also if the game has infinitely many strategies..The bulk of this chapter consists of various, diverse examples verifying these claims. The main objective of the chapter is, indeed, to show how the basic game-theoretic apparatus can be applied to vari作者: limber 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 05:35
An Introduction to Evolutionary Gamesor a somewhat more advanced continuation see Chap. 15..In Sect. 8.1 we consider symmetric two-player games and evolutionary stable strategies. Evolutionary stability is meant to capture the idea of . from the theory of evolution. We also establish that an evolutionary stable strategy is part of a sy作者: Charade 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 11:43
Cooperative Games with Transferable Utilityssed in monetary terms..This chapter presents a first acquaintance with the theory of cooperative games with transferable utility.. A few important solution concepts — the core, the Shapley value, and the nucleolus – are briefly discussed in Sects. 9.2–9.4. We start with examples and preliminaries i作者: 分散 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 16:57 作者: 分散 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 19:12 作者: 遭遇 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 21:46 作者: 頭腦冷靜 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 03:57 作者: Delectable 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 07:23
Der Wind, die Bewegung der Luft, for instance, the game of entry deterrence with incomplete information in Sect. 1.3.3: for the analysis of games with incomplete information see Chap. 5. Chapter 14 extends the analysis of the present and the next chapter..The first section of this chapter introduces games in extensive form. In ord作者: 意外的成功 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 12:02
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-29400-0 are the marginal probability distributions derived from a basic commonly known distribution over all combinations of player types..In this chapter we consider games with finitely many players, finitely many types, and finitely many strategies. These games can be either static (simultaneous, one-sho作者: Innovative 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 17:33 作者: 辮子帶來幫助 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 20:11
Statistik und Wahrscheinlichkeitor a somewhat more advanced continuation see Chap. 15..In Sect. 8.1 we consider symmetric two-player games and evolutionary stable strategies. Evolutionary stability is meant to capture the idea of . from the theory of evolution. We also establish that an evolutionary stable strategy is part of a sy作者: 不吉祥的女人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 00:22
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48229-8ssed in monetary terms..This chapter presents a first acquaintance with the theory of cooperative games with transferable utility.. A few important solution concepts — the core, the Shapley value, and the nucleolus – are briefly discussed in Sects. 9.2–9.4. We start with examples and preliminaries i作者: 緊張過度 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 04:36 作者: Judicious 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 10:00 作者: Obligatory 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 11:16 作者: 團(tuán)結(jié) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 16:42
lity games, such as core and balancedness, Shapley value and variations, and nucleolus. Some mathematical tools on duality and convexity are collected in Part IV. Every chapter in the book concludes with a problem section. Hints, answers and solutions are included..978-3-540-69291-1作者: ODIUM 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 20:39
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2008作者: Mercurial 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 23:57
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69291-1Applications of Game Theory; Nash equilibrium; Noncooperative Games; bargaining; cooperative games; duali作者: aggrieve 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 06:35 作者: Felicitous 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 08:32
IntroductionThe best introduction to game theory is by way of examples. In this chapter we start with a global definition of the field in Sect. 1.1, collect some historical facts in Sect. 1.2, and present examples in Sect. 1.3. In Sect. 1.4 we briefly comment on the distinction between cooperative and noncooperative game theory.作者: 發(fā)電機(jī) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 13:39
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-5020-7 sum of the players’ payoffs or expected payoffs is always equal to zero. Games like the ‘Battle of the Bismarck Sea’ and ‘Matching Pennies’, discussed in Sect. 1.3.1 belong to this class..In Sect. 2.1 the basic definitions and theory are discussed. Section 2.2 shows how to solve 2 × . and . × 2 gam作者: 胎兒 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 17:59
G?sta H. Liljequist,Konrad Cehaktrast to Chap. 2 it is no longer required that the sum of the players’ payoffs is zero (or, equivalently, constant). This allows for a much larger class of games, including many games relevant for economic or other applications. Famous examples are the ‘Prisoners’ Dilemma’ and the ‘Battle of the Sex作者: 同步左右 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 20:26 作者: 無孔 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 03:09 作者: sterilization 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 05:28 作者: Amnesty 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 12:33
Die Statistik in der Vergangenheita Nash equilibrium or subgame perfect Nash equilibrium even if the game is repeated a finite number of times, cf. Problem 4.8(a)–(c). As we will see in this chapter, this bad outcome can be avoided if the game is repeated an infinite number of times. This, however, is going to have a price, namely t作者: 受人支配 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 13:17 作者: Facilities 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 17:03 作者: 物質(zhì) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 21:03
Physikalische krankmachende Faktoren (Folge)he strategic possibilities of a player; instead, a detailed description of what players and coalitions can attain in terms of outcomes or utilities; solution concepts based on strategic considerations and/or considerations of fairness, equity, efficiency, etc.; if possible, an axiomatic characteriza作者: 同義聯(lián)想法 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 01:46
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-42363-9ciplines, such as political theory (e.g., voting for Parliament, or for a president) and game theory (e.g., voters may vote strategically, or candidates may choose positions strategically). For a general overview see [3] and [4]..In the classical model of social choice, there is a finite number of a作者: 尊嚴(yán) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 07:44
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-7529-3d. The chapter builds on Chap. 2 in Part I, and the reader is advised to read this chapter and in particular Definition 2.1 before continuing..Section 12.1 presents a proof of the Minimax Theorem, and Sect. 12.2 shows how a matrix game can be solved – optimal strategies and the value of the game can作者: Estimable 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 12:40 作者: BURSA 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 15:44
Diagnostik der Hautkrankheiten, moves occur, and what the final payoffs are. Such games are discussed in Chaps. 4 and 5, and also occur in Chaps. 6 and 7. The present chapter extends the material introduced in the first two mentioned chapters, and the reader is advised to (re)read these chapters before continuing..Section 14.1 fo作者: scrutiny 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 21:23 作者: Inculcate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 01:27
O. Mangold,J. Runnstr?m,M. Popoffayoff or utility that the coalition can achieve if it forms. It is assumed that this payoff can be freely distributed among the members of the coalition in any way desired..For some examples the reader is referred to Chap. 1. Chapter 9 presents a first acquaintance with transferable utility games. A作者: 遍及 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 04:30 作者: 進(jìn)取心 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 09:17 作者: 效果 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 12:19
Allgemeine Eigenschaften der Protoplasten,h, however, does not have to be in the core..The . (Schmeidler [116]) assigns to each game with a nonempty imputation set a unique element of that imputation set; moreover, this element is in the core if the core of the game is nonempty. The . always exists (and does not have to be an imputation, ev作者: 憎惡 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 15:25 作者: 有節(jié)制 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 21:10 作者: META 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 02:43
Die Statistik in der Vergangenheit]..In this chapter we consider two-person . repeated games and formulate Folk theorems both for subgame perfect and for Nash equilibrium. The approach is somewhat informal, and mainly based on examples. In Sect. 7.1 we consider subgame perfect equilibrium and in Sect. 7.2 we consider Nash equilibrium.作者: 雇傭兵 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 04:30
Physikalische krankmachende Faktoren (Folge)ation as in Problem 9.13..In this chapter a few other cooperative game theory models are discussed: bargaining problems in Sect. 10.1, exchange economies in Sect. 10.2, matching problems in Sect. 10.3, and house exchange in Sect. 10.4.作者: Regurgitation 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 09:19
Finite Two-Person Gamespt of strict domination to facilitate computation of Nash equilibria and to compute equilibria also of larger games. The structure of this chapter thus parallels the structure of Chap. 2. For a deeper and more comprehensive analysis of finite two-person games see Chap. 13.作者: capsule 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 13:14 作者: 形容詞 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 18:14 作者: arboretum 時(shí)間: 2025-3-29 22:53
Finite Two-Person Zero-Sum Gamesd in Sect. 1.3.1 belong to this class..In Sect. 2.1 the basic definitions and theory are discussed. Section 2.2 shows how to solve 2 × . and . × 2 games, and larger games by elimination of strictly dominated strategies.作者: 物質(zhì) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 02:12
Matrix Games 12.1 presents a proof of the Minimax Theorem, and Sect. 12.2 shows how a matrix game can be solved – optimal strategies and the value of the game can be found – by solving an associated linear programming problem.作者: sperse 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 07:27 作者: 故意 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 11:54
f interest in game theory, including cooperative game theory.This book presents the basics of game theory both on an undergraduate level and on a more advanced mathematical level. It covers most topics of interest in game theory, including cooperative game theory. Part I presents introductions to al作者: Seminar 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 14:28 作者: 與野獸博斗者 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 20:24
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-7529-3 12.1 presents a proof of the Minimax Theorem, and Sect. 12.2 shows how a matrix game can be solved – optimal strategies and the value of the game can be found – by solving an associated linear programming problem.作者: PRE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-30 22:16
Reaktionsbereitschaft des Organismus,the present chapter is largely self-contained..This chapter is based mainly on [147]. In Sect. 15.1 we briefly review symmetric two-player games. Section 15.2 discusses evolutionary stable strategies and Sect. 15.3 replicator dynamics.作者: Discrete 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 02:25 作者: 迅速飛過 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 08:55
Core, Shapley Value, and Weber Setvalue is an attractive core selection (Sect. 18.2). Finally, we study random order values (Sect. 18.3), which fill out the Weber set, and the subset of weighted Shapley values, which still cover the core (Sect. 18.4).作者: FLAT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 11:34
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-48202-1 basics about refinements of Nash equilibrium. Section 13.7 is on correlated equilibrium in bimatrix games, and Sect. 13.8 concludes with an axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium based on a reduced game (consistency) condition.作者: 東西 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 14:59
Diagnostik der Hautkrankheiten, mixed strategies. Section 14.3 is on Nash equilibrium and its main refinements, namely subgame perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. For more about refinements and some relations with refinements of Nash equilibrium in strategic form games see [138] and [102].作者: forbid 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 20:59 作者: 陳列 時(shí)間: 2025-3-31 21:45 作者: reaching 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 01:58 作者: 殺人 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 09:24 作者: Negligible 時(shí)間: 2025-4-1 11:26
