標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Game Theoretical Foundations of Evolutionary Stability; Immanuel M. Bomze,Benedikt M. P?tscher Book 1989 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg [打印本頁(yè)] 作者: ABS 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 20:09
書目名稱Game Theoretical Foundations of Evolutionary Stability影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Game Theoretical Foundations of Evolutionary Stability影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theoretical Foundations of Evolutionary Stability網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度
書目名稱Game Theoretical Foundations of Evolutionary Stability網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theoretical Foundations of Evolutionary Stability被引頻次
書目名稱Game Theoretical Foundations of Evolutionary Stability被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theoretical Foundations of Evolutionary Stability年度引用
書目名稱Game Theoretical Foundations of Evolutionary Stability年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Game Theoretical Foundations of Evolutionary Stability讀者反饋
書目名稱Game Theoretical Foundations of Evolutionary Stability讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 致命 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 00:15 作者: 為敵 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 02:21 作者: palpitate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 04:58 作者: motivate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 09:41
Mixed strategies, ., . ∈ .. Here .: .→?. maps a distribution . to the vector .(.) of mean payoffs to the pure strategies against members of a population in state .. Using these relations, we have .∈ε.if and only if for all . ∈ ., . ≠ ., . holds whenever 0<ε<ε(.). Similarly, .∈ξ. if and only if作者: Condyle 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 15:39 作者: Condyle 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 20:37
Replicator dynamics,, uninvadability implies dynamical stability (defined below), whereas evolutionary stability neither implies nor is implied by the dynamical stability concept; see, e.g. [. 1987, p.226, Fig.9.4.4b], and Example 18 below.作者: Employee 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 22:52 作者: Repatriate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 02:04
Introduction,racting individuals and to explain why certain states of a given population are — in course of the selection process — stable against perturbations induced by mutations. In particular, an explanation is sought how stable polymorphisms of behaviour can arise in a population, as is observed, e.g., in certain mammal societies.作者: Misnomer 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 09:30 作者: APNEA 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 11:25 作者: 狂亂 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 17:36 作者: 瑣碎 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 20:06 作者: enflame 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 23:27
Allergie und der respiratorische Infekt,, uninvadability implies dynamical stability (defined below), whereas evolutionary stability neither implies nor is implied by the dynamical stability concept; see, e.g. [. 1987, p.226, Fig.9.4.4b], and Example 18 below.作者: 符合你規(guī)定 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 04:05 作者: oxidant 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 09:26 作者: CODA 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 12:37 作者: FLAGR 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 14:49 作者: Narrative 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 22:10 作者: albuminuria 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 00:38
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-80331-4y over time whereas others do not? These questions are central in the theory of biological evolution. The concept of evolutionary stability introduced in [. 1973] and [. 1974] provides a framework allowing for a formal analysis of these and related problems. (Forerunners of the idea of evolutionary 作者: arboretum 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 04:03
The Human Brain/Body Input/Output,ble”, “invasion proof”, or “uninvadable” synonymously for “evolutionarily stable”. However, in this book we reserve the notion of uninvadability (Chapter 4) for a concept different from evolutionary stability. This latter notion is introduced in Section 3.1, where the equivalence of two alternative 作者: 雪崩 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 08:15
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-26733-2nd . [1985] use the terms “uninvadable” and “evolutionary stable” synonymously). According to our definition in Section 4.1, a state is uninvadable if it is protected by a positive . invasion barrier. As it turns out, this concept guarantees stability in dynamical models for the time evolution of di作者: arterioles 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 13:07
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-41347-0idered in the literature, see e.g. [. 1974], [. 1977], [. 1978], [. et al., 1979], [. 1980 and 1981]. Section 5.1 contains a characterization of such models. It is shown that these models are essentially evolutionary games consisting of pairwise conflicts. Some of the results in Chapters 3 and 4 are作者: single 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 19:19
Wie kommt es zu einer Allergie?, and . ∈ .. As a consequence, the average mean payoff is given by .(.)=xˉ.′.(.), and the score functions take the form ..(ε) = (.ˉ.—.ˉ.)′.(..(.)), for ., . ∈ .. Here .: .→?. maps a distribution . to the vector .(.) of mean payoffs to the pure strategies against members of a population in state .. Us作者: Tractable 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 23:13
Chronische Infektionskrankheitencharacterized by the fact that the mean payoff function depends on the state .∈. only through its population strategy: . where the function . now fully describes the payoff situation. Now . depends only on the population strategies which vary in the finite dimensional set .ˉ, and hence much stronger作者: 前面 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 03:37
Allergie und der respiratorische Infekt,ies. In Section 8.1, we study the relationship between uninvadability and another stability concept arising in this dynamical context. As it turns out, uninvadability implies dynamical stability (defined below), whereas evolutionary stability neither implies nor is implied by the dynamical stability作者: Ingredient 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 05:02 作者: 儀式 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 08:36 作者: 陶醉 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 13:48 作者: 陳腐的人 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 19:47 作者: 新娘 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 21:14 作者: 敵意 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 01:11
Book 1989Contents 1. Introduction 1 2. Strategies and payoffs 5 2. 1. A general setting for evolutionary game theory 6 2. 2. Mixed strategies and population games 8 2. 3. Finite number of strategies . . . . . 13 2. 4. Infinitely many (pure) strategies 15 2. 5. Structured populations: asymmetric contests and 作者: perjury 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 08:13
Introduction,y over time whereas others do not? These questions are central in the theory of biological evolution. The concept of evolutionary stability introduced in [. 1973] and [. 1974] provides a framework allowing for a formal analysis of these and related problems. (Forerunners of the idea of evolutionary 作者: MOTTO 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 10:57 作者: ALE 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 15:52
Global invasion barriers,nd . [1985] use the terms “uninvadable” and “evolutionary stable” synonymously). According to our definition in Section 4.1, a state is uninvadable if it is protected by a positive . invasion barrier. As it turns out, this concept guarantees stability in dynamical models for the time evolution of di作者: diathermy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 20:49
Games with bilinear average mean payoff,idered in the literature, see e.g. [. 1974], [. 1977], [. 1978], [. et al., 1979], [. 1980 and 1981]. Section 5.1 contains a characterization of such models. It is shown that these models are essentially evolutionary games consisting of pairwise conflicts. Some of the results in Chapters 3 and 4 are作者: 偽書 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 00:22
Mixed strategies, and . ∈ .. As a consequence, the average mean payoff is given by .(.)=xˉ.′.(.), and the score functions take the form ..(ε) = (.ˉ.—.ˉ.)′.(..(.)), for ., . ∈ .. Here .: .→?. maps a distribution . to the vector .(.) of mean payoffs to the pure strategies against members of a population in state .. Us作者: 揭穿真相 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 03:47 作者: Decline 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 10:03 作者: dry-eye 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 11:09
Jürgen Boelcke,Bernard Straub,Paul Thielebusiness or mission values. Emergent app- cation requirements create a need for ambiguity tolerance. Systems of systems and global development create needs for 978-3-540-31112-6978-3-540-32450-8Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349 作者: debacle 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 14:35
Guy André BoyPresents a framework to design sociotechnical systems that are more flexible.Discusses a shift from rigid automation to flexible autonomy using a new approach to Human System Integration.Includes both作者: Conflagration 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 21:25
Rules for Counting Warships, 1494–1860e development of the ship-of-the-line, the capital warship of the mid-seventeenth to the first half of the nineteenth centuries. Nevertheless, this period constitutes less than half and closer to a third of the five centuries in question. Clearly, the operationalisation procedures will have to go be作者: 砍伐 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 23:54
