標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision; Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer Book 2011 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nat [打印本頁] 作者: Coolidge 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 16:42
書目名稱Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision被引頻次
書目名稱Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision年度引用
書目名稱Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision讀者反饋
書目名稱Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: 高度贊揚(yáng) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 22:09 作者: hermetic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 03:53
Public-Private Partnerships versus Traditional Procurement: Innovation Incentives and Information Gaased services in various sectors such as health care, education, and transportation. As has been pointed out by Hart (2003), a key property of a public-private partnership is the fact that facility construction and subsequent service provision are bundled and assigned to a single private-sector enti作者: 嘲笑 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 06:32
The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Struction structure is exogenously given, more recently a relatively small literature has emerged in which the agent is not privately informed from the outset, but has the ability to acquire private information; i.e., the information structure is endogenous.作者: boisterous 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 12:37
Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidenceufficient incentives to make non-contractible investments if it fears that it will be held up by its partner in the future. This hold-up problem is an important ingredient of the incomplete contracting approach, which has become a leading paradigm in institutional and organizational economics.作者: 阻擋 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 16:33
Conflicting Tasks and Moral Hazard: Theory and Experimental Evidencetions in which two different tasks to be delegated may be in direct conflict with each other; i.e., providing effort in one task may have a negative side effect on the success probability of the other task. In such situations, job design becomes a major issue.作者: 阻擋 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 19:15 作者: 小步舞 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 00:05
Arkendu Sen,Lakshmi Selvaratnamthe design of selling and procurement mechanisms, the provision of investment incentives in trading relationships, the design of wage schemes, and the assignment of different tasks within firms, have all been fruitfully studied from a contract-theoretic perspective.作者: Diskectomy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 01:24 作者: 似少年 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 09:37 作者: 玉米 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 12:52 作者: Irritate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 14:34
Book 2011conomics in the last decades. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. In such models it is typically as作者: Ostrich 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 18:39 作者: 警告 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 01:43 作者: CLASH 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 02:49
Arkendu Sen,Lakshmi Selvaratnamesearch in microeconomics in the last three decades. Emphasizing the importance of unverifiable actions and privately held information, contract theory provides formal tools to analyze various aspects of the organization of economic activities and relationships. For instance, issues as diverse as th作者: follicular-unit 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 07:00 作者: Enteropathic 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 11:53
The Current Situation and Future Challengesased services in various sectors such as health care, education, and transportation. As has been pointed out by Hart (2003), a key property of a public-private partnership is the fact that facility construction and subsequent service provision are bundled and assigned to a single private-sector enti作者: indifferent 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 18:06
,Trust Negotiation and?Its Applications,ion structure is exogenously given, more recently a relatively small literature has emerged in which the agent is not privately informed from the outset, but has the ability to acquire private information; i.e., the information structure is endogenous.作者: 河潭 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 19:46
Collaborative Business und Web Servicesufficient incentives to make non-contractible investments if it fears that it will be held up by its partner in the future. This hold-up problem is an important ingredient of the incomplete contracting approach, which has become a leading paradigm in institutional and organizational economics.作者: 平淡而無味 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 03:07
Oil—The Turbulent Years (1979–2001)tions in which two different tasks to be delegated may be in direct conflict with each other; i.e., providing effort in one task may have a negative side effect on the success probability of the other task. In such situations, job design becomes a major issue.作者: 神圣不可 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 04:50
Collaborative Communities of Firmse cognitive reflection test (CRT) which is a simple, three-item test to measure a person’s mode of reasoning and cognitive ability. Frederick (2005) shows that people with high CRT scores are generally more patient and more willing to gamble in the domain of gains.作者: 射手座 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 09:08
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24133-9contract design; incentive provisions; public-private partnerships; behavioral biases; public ownership; 作者: crescendo 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 12:55
978-3-658-24132-2Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2011作者: 本能 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 17:46 作者: Perennial長(zhǎng)期的 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 20:01 作者: 剛毅 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 01:54 作者: FLIT 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 07:15 作者: 祖先 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 12:01 作者: 起波瀾 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 16:30
Collaborative Business und Web Servicesufficient incentives to make non-contractible investments if it fears that it will be held up by its partner in the future. This hold-up problem is an important ingredient of the incomplete contracting approach, which has become a leading paradigm in institutional and organizational economics.作者: 嫌惡 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 17:53
Oil—The Turbulent Years (1979–2001)tions in which two different tasks to be delegated may be in direct conflict with each other; i.e., providing effort in one task may have a negative side effect on the success probability of the other task. In such situations, job design becomes a major issue.作者: arabesque 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 00:38
Collaborative Communities of Firmse cognitive reflection test (CRT) which is a simple, three-item test to measure a person’s mode of reasoning and cognitive ability. Frederick (2005) shows that people with high CRT scores are generally more patient and more willing to gamble in the domain of gains.作者: 拍翅 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 04:46 作者: eulogize 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 07:48 作者: VOC 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 10:01 作者: 美色花錢 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 14:01 作者: 贊美者 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 21:50
Behavioral Biases and Cognitive Reflectione cognitive reflection test (CRT) which is a simple, three-item test to measure a person’s mode of reasoning and cognitive ability. Frederick (2005) shows that people with high CRT scores are generally more patient and more willing to gamble in the domain of gains.作者: Morose 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 22:25 作者: Cardioversion 時(shí)間: 2025-3-28 03:33
