標題: Titlebook: Essays in Game Theory; In Honor of Michael Nimrod Megiddo Book 1994 Springer-Verlag New York, Inc. 1994 Area.Matching.Volume.calculus.fiel [打印本頁] 作者: ED431 時間: 2025-3-21 17:06
書目名稱Essays in Game Theory影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Essays in Game Theory影響因子(影響力)學科排名
書目名稱Essays in Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Essays in Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學科排名
書目名稱Essays in Game Theory被引頻次
書目名稱Essays in Game Theory被引頻次學科排名
書目名稱Essays in Game Theory年度引用
書目名稱Essays in Game Theory年度引用學科排名
書目名稱Essays in Game Theory讀者反饋
書目名稱Essays in Game Theory讀者反饋學科排名
作者: Salivary-Gland 時間: 2025-3-21 23:23
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-00705-9The pioneering work of Aumann, Maschler and Stearns (1968) on infinitely repeated games with incomplete information has obviously given rise to extensions of the Folk theorem. In this paper, we show that their analysis has also provided fundamental hints for the characterization of the solutions of (one-shot) games of information transmission.作者: Deject 時間: 2025-3-22 03:57
Molecular Beams and Cluster Nucleation,The theory of social situations due to Greenberg is applied to information trading. The solution concept, defined by Nakayama, Quintas, and Muto as a resale-proof trade, is shown to be derived as a unique stable standard of behavior for a situation which we call the information trading situation.作者: 正常 時間: 2025-3-22 08:33 作者: 效果 時間: 2025-3-22 12:14
Non-Zero Sum Repeated Games and Information Transmission,The pioneering work of Aumann, Maschler and Stearns (1968) on infinitely repeated games with incomplete information has obviously given rise to extensions of the Folk theorem. In this paper, we show that their analysis has also provided fundamental hints for the characterization of the solutions of (one-shot) games of information transmission.作者: HUSH 時間: 2025-3-22 15:27 作者: HUSH 時間: 2025-3-22 17:38 作者: Integrate 時間: 2025-3-22 23:33
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2Area; Matching; Volume; calculus; field; game theory; games; management; operations research; themes; combinat作者: 感情脆弱 時間: 2025-3-23 04:41 作者: Melanoma 時間: 2025-3-23 07:46
True Hermaphroditism (Ovotesticular DSD),e kernel for TU games was introduced by Davis and Maschler [9] and its mathematical structure was further developed by Maschler and Peleg [15], [16]. The kernel is a subset of the bargaining set (Aumann and Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley [17], [18].作者: 真 時間: 2025-3-23 12:00 作者: engrave 時間: 2025-3-23 16:33 作者: 先行 時間: 2025-3-23 18:22 作者: 高興去去 時間: 2025-3-23 22:22 作者: graphy 時間: 2025-3-24 06:25 作者: 積習難改 時間: 2025-3-24 08:31 作者: 使困惑 時間: 2025-3-24 13:19
Games in Support Function Form: An Approach to the Kernel of NTU Games,e kernel for TU games was introduced by Davis and Maschler [9] and its mathematical structure was further developed by Maschler and Peleg [15], [16]. The kernel is a subset of the bargaining set (Aumann and Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley [17], [18].作者: Calibrate 時間: 2025-3-24 15:09
On Prize Games,e coalition to another. H-games have turned out in various approaches to the value of general non-transferable utility (NTU) games. In this paper we introduce a simple model — . — that generates the hyperplane games. Next, we provide an axiomatization for the Maschler & Owen [4] consistent value of H-games.作者: 一大群 時間: 2025-3-24 23:02 作者: antipsychotic 時間: 2025-3-25 01:58
Consistent Demands for Coalition Formation,on in a coalition. These demands have several appealing features. We characterize the sets of semi-stable and stable demand vectors for general NTU games using consistency requirements that relate the demands formed in the initial game to demands formed by subgroups considering their outside options.作者: Incise 時間: 2025-3-25 06:07
The Kernel of Homogeneous Games with Steps,lution (or main simple solution). Peleg [9] discussed the kernel and nucleolus within this framework. The general theory of non-constant sum homogeneous games was developed by Ostmann [8], Rosenmüller [14], [15], [16] and Sudh?lter [19].作者: Memorial 時間: 2025-3-25 10:20
On the Locus of the Nucleolus, subsets of ., the kernel and the least core, only dependent on the set . that contain this locus. From this fact we derive that for a set . which is the core of . the locus consists of one point. We also give a necessary and sufficient condition that the locus consists of one point.作者: EXTOL 時間: 2025-3-25 15:37
Mitzi L. Williams,Matthew B. Dobbsng-term context of continuing international rivalry — for short, “l(fā)ong term competition”. The most characteristic feature of these models is that they extend over time in a fairly regular or repetitive manner. The underlying structure of possible actions and consequences remains the same, though par作者: 皮薩 時間: 2025-3-25 18:01
Electron Microscopy and Ultra-Structures,7 and was based on my M.Sc. Thesis, written in 1975–6 at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem under the supervision of Professor B. Peleg. Other parts of the report were published in “Equilibrium in Supergames with the Overtaking Criterion,” .. (1979) 1–9, and “Strong Perfect Equilibrium in Supergames作者: APRON 時間: 2025-3-25 20:18
Metabolic and Mitochondrial Myopathies,ntry on one side of the market makes that side worse off and the other side better off than before entry occurred. An example shows that the adjustment process described by Roth and Vande Vate lacks this property; there may be winners and losers on both sides.作者: Clinch 時間: 2025-3-26 00:12 作者: miracle 時間: 2025-3-26 05:10 作者: 迅速飛過 時間: 2025-3-26 10:44
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-37243-1cordingly we investigate in this paper the Davis-Maschler reduced game of some linear production games. We introduce the extended linear production game model, which generalizes Owen’s linear production game model. We show that the Davis-Maschler reduced game of the extended linear production game, 作者: 輕觸 時間: 2025-3-26 14:20
Patrick L. Odell,Benjamin S. Durane coalition to another. H-games have turned out in various approaches to the value of general non-transferable utility (NTU) games. In this paper we introduce a simple model — . — that generates the hyperplane games. Next, we provide an axiomatization for the Maschler & Owen [4] consistent value of 作者: patriarch 時間: 2025-3-26 19:29 作者: Foment 時間: 2025-3-27 00:28 作者: VAN 時間: 2025-3-27 02:37 作者: 善于 時間: 2025-3-27 07:38 作者: 音的強弱 時間: 2025-3-27 13:24
978-1-4612-7621-0Springer-Verlag New York, Inc. 1994作者: 安裝 時間: 2025-3-27 16:58
heory, Maschler has become an important figure particularly in the area of cooperative games. Game theory has since become an important subject in operations research, economics and management science. As befits such a volume, the main themes covered are cooperative games, coalitions, repeated games作者: pessimism 時間: 2025-3-27 21:17 作者: monopoly 時間: 2025-3-28 01:44 作者: CRASS 時間: 2025-3-28 05:15
, and a cost allocation games. All the contributions are authoritative surveys of a particular topic, so together they will present an invaluable overview of the field to all those working on game theory problems.978-1-4612-7621-0978-1-4612-2648-2作者: 柔聲地說 時間: 2025-3-28 08:13 作者: CLAM 時間: 2025-3-28 14:16 作者: Truculent 時間: 2025-3-28 16:30 作者: 虛假 時間: 2025-3-28 19:16 作者: 決定性 時間: 2025-3-29 02:56 作者: pantomime 時間: 2025-3-29 04:27
Relationships Between Bankruptcy Games and Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games,ion of bankruptcy games as minimum cost spanning tree games. Finally, it is shown that a particular cost allocation rule for the minimum cost spanning tree allocation problem agrees with a certain division rule for the bankruptcy problem.作者: 手勢 時間: 2025-3-29 08:24
Mitzi L. Williams,Matthew B. Dobbs trouble lies less with the ., — i.e., formulating the “rules of the game” in a dynamic setting, than with the choice of a .. that will do dynamic justice to the interplay of motivations of the actors. (Game theoreticians, like mathematical economists, have always been more comfortable with static t作者: 單純 時間: 2025-3-29 13:01 作者: orthodox 時間: 2025-3-29 18:31 作者: 牌帶來 時間: 2025-3-29 20:35
Equilibrium in Supergames,7 and was based on my M.Sc. Thesis, written in 1975–6 at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem under the supervision of Professor B. Peleg. Other parts of the report were published in “Equilibrium in Supergames with the Overtaking Criterion,” .. (1979) 1–9, and “Strong Perfect Equilibrium in Supergames作者: entail 時間: 2025-3-30 01:16
Entry, Divorce and Re-Marriage in Matching Markets,ntry on one side of the market makes that side worse off and the other side better off than before entry occurred. An example shows that the adjustment process described by Roth and Vande Vate lacks this property; there may be winners and losers on both sides.作者: 上坡 時間: 2025-3-30 08:05
